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America has begun to censor the Internet. Defying conventional scholarly wisdom
that Supreme Courtprecedent bars Internet censorship,federal and state governments are
increasingly using indirect methods to engage in "soft" blocking of online material. This

Article assesses these methods and makes a controversialclaim: hard censorship, such as
the PROTECT IP and Stop Online Piracy Acts, are normatively preferable to indirect
restrictions.It introduces a taxonomy of five censorship strategies:direct control, deputizing intermediaries,payment, pretext, and persuasion. It next makes three core claims.
First, only one strategy-deputizing intermediaries-islimited significantly by current
law. Government retains considerablefreedom of action to employ the other methods
and has begun to do so. Second, the Article employs a process-based methodology to argue that indirect censorship strategies are less legitimate than direct regulation.Lastly, it
proposes using specialized legislation if the United States decides to conduct Intemet
censorship and sets out key components that a statute must include to be legitimate, with
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the goal of aligning censorship with priorrestraintdoctrine.It concludes by assessing how
soft Internet censorship affects current scholarly debates over the state's role in
shaping information online, sounding a skeptical note about government's potential to
balancecommunication.
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Orwell'sArmchair

[T]he supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small
complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most
original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not
shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced
by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting.
Alexis de Tocqueville'
INTRODUCTION

William Walsh was shocked to learn that he was a child
pornographer.
On February 11, 2011, the IT administrator's personal blog at
greyghost.mooo.com-containing information about his hobbies,
computer product preferences, and family-was replaced by a page
showing logos from the Department of Justice and the Department
of Homeland Security over text stating that "[a]dvertisement, distribution, transportation, receipt, and possession of child pornography
constitute federal crimes., 2 The page stated that the government had
seized Walsh's domain name under the civil forfeiture provision of
the federal anti-child pornography statute According to the government, Walsh's site was involved in the sordid international trade
in child sexual abuse images.
However, Walsh and his site were innocent. So were Kent Frazier," Moon's Garage,5 and Seppo Kiuru,6 though their sites were also
labeled as child pornography. Theirs were among the eighty-four
thousand websites swept up in a law enforcement effort to interdict
ten sites accused of distributing child pornography As part of Operation Protect Our Children, the Departments of Justice and HomeI Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 319 (Knopf 1945) (Henry
Reeve, trans).
2
Ernesto Van Der Sar, U.S. Government Shuts Down 84,000 Websites, 'by Mistake' (TorrentFreak Feb 16, 2011), online at http://torrentfreak.com/u-s-government-shuts-down-84000websites-by-mistake-110216 (visited Sept 20, 2012). See William R. Walsh, From the Blithering
Idiots
Department..
(Feb
12,
2011),
online
at
http://stop-error.xanga.com/
741136585/from-the-blithering-idiots-department (visited Sept 20, 2012); May I Have a Moment
of Your Time? (Apr 17,2012), online at http://greyghost.mooo.com (visited Sept 20, 2012).
3
18 USC §2254.
4
Frazier's site, once located at http://kfrazier.mooo.com, was treated like Walsh's site.
5
See http://moon.mooo.com (visited Sept 20, 2012).
6
See http://www.kiuru.mooo.com (visited Sept 20,2012).
7
See Thomas Claburn, ICE Confirms Inadvertent Web Site Seizures (InformationWeek
Feb 18, 2011), online at http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/vulnerabilities/
229218959 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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land Security took control over ten domain names believed to host
child pornography.8 One of those domain names, mooo.com, was
used by a service provider named FreeDNS to offer domain name
hosting at no charge.9 Thus, Walsh could have the FreeDNS service
resolve requests for his site's domain name, greyghost.mooo.com, to
his computer's IP address. Over eighty-four thousand other sites
used FreeDNS for the same purpose." All were labeled as child pornography when the government seized the top-level domain name
mooo.com rather than targeting the specific subdomains believed to
host illicit content.
Facing a storm of protest, the government rescinded its seizure
of mooo.com three days later.1 FreeDNS maintained that it had
"never allowed this type of abuse of its DNS service. However, the
forfeiture provision allowed the government to seize mooo.com after
an ex parte hearing, without notifying or involving FreeDNS." This
effectively forced FreeDNS and the site owners to prove their innocence in order to continue to publish online.
America has begun to censor the Internet. In addition to
Walsh's blog, the federal government has blocked other law-abiding
sites without notice, from pages about Cuban music14 to soccer
broadcasts 5 to WikiLeaks. 6 In the past year, it seized 125 domain
8
See Department of Homeland Security, Joint DHS-DOJ "Operation Protect Our
Children" Seizes Website DomainsInvolved in Advertising and DistributingChild Pornography
(Feb 15, 2011), online at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1297804574965.shtm (visited
Sept 20, 2012).
9
See FreeDNS, News! (Feb 12, 2011), online at http://freedns.afraid.org/news (visited
Sept 20, 2012) (noting, for February 12, 2011, that "mooo.com (the most popular shared domain at afraid.org) was suspended at the registrar level").
10 See Jamie Zoch, When Mooo.com Was Seized by ICE, 80K Subdomains Affected
(DotWeekly Feb 15, 2011), online at http://www.dotweekly.com/when-mooo-com-was-seized
-by-ice-80k-subdomains-affected (visited Sept 20, 2012).
11 See Matt Liebowitz and Paul Wagenseil, Oops! Child-Porn Seizure Shuts Down
84,000 Innocent Sites (MSNBC Mar 30, 2011), online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/41649634 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
12
FreeDNS, News! (cited in note 9).
13
See 18 USC § 2254; 18 USC § 983(a)(1)(A)(ii). See also Derek Bambauer, U.S. Gets

in on Censorship Action (Info/Law Dec 2, 2010), online at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
infolaw/2010/12/02/u-s-gets-in-on-censorship-action (visited Sept 20, 2012); Dan Goodin, Unprecedented Domain Seizure Shutters 84,000 Sites (The Register Feb 18, 2011), online at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/18/fed-domain_seizure_slammed (visited Sept 20, 2012).
14
See Adam Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, and Speech Disappears,NY Times A16
(Mar 4, 2008) (reporting the blacklisting of Cuban history and culture websites by the Treasury
Department due to its suspicion that the owner was facilitating transit to Cuba, despite the fact
that the websites themselves were unrelated to such facilitation).
15
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Puerto 80's Petition for
Release of Seized Property and in Support of Request for Expedited Briefing and Hearing of
Same, Puerto 80 Projects S.L. U. v United States, No 11-cv-03983, *2-3, 9, 15-20 (SDNY filed
Jun 13, 2011) ("Rojadirecta Memorandum") (arguing that a website that provided a forum for
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names 17 as part of a new strategic plan for intellectual-property enforcement, 10 for alleged child-pornography distribution," and 24
9 This online censorship defies
based on involvement in a botnet.
20 which holds that the end of history 2'
conventional scholarly wisdom,
for American Internet filtering occurred in 2004, after the Supreme
Court decisions that invalidated the Communications Decency Act
of 199622 (CDA) and its progeny, the Child Online Protection Act 23
(COPA).
The reality, though, is not so simple. Hard censorship, where the
government exerts control directly over Internet infrastructure or
forces intermediaries to do so through law, is still largely blocked by
architectural and constitutional constraints. However, this Article
argues that government retains powerful tools to prevent access to
disfavored Internet content through soft censorship: employing unrelated laws as a pretext to block material, paying for filtered access, or
persuading intermediaries to restrict content.24 While these methods
are more indirect than a straightforward statutory prohibition, they
are formidable precisely because they are less visible and less obviously a prior restraint. Moreover, they have not yet been thoroughly
users to post links to video streams of sporting events was not violating copyright law and
should be released from seizure pending trial).
See Order Granting Permanent Injunction, Bank Julius Baer & Co v WikiLeaks, No
16
C 08-00824 JSW, *1-2 (ND Cal filed Feb 14, 2008).
17
See US Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 2011 U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator Joint Strategic Plan: One Year Anniversary 5 (June 2011),
(visited
online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ipec-anniversary-report.pdf
Sept 23, 2012).
18
See Department of Justice, Federal Courts Order Seizure of Website Domains Involved in Advertising and Distributing Child Pornography (Feb 15, 2011), online at
18
9.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm19
See Public Interest Registry, 2011 Takedown Notices (Apr 12, 2011), online at
http://pir.org/why/takedowns2011 (visited Sept 20, 2012). A botnet is a collection of computers
that are connected to the Internet and compromised by an attacker.
20
See, for example, John Copeland Nagle, Pornographyas Pollution, 70 Md L Rev 939,
952 (2011); Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in Saul Levmore
and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation 155,
155 (Harvard 2010); Martha McCarthy, The ContinuingSaga of Internet Censorship: The Child
Online Protection Act, 2005 BYU Educ & L J 83, 87-94 (Issue 2); Susan Hanley Kosse, Try,
Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right? A Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U Richmond L Rev 721, 728-38 (2004).
21
Consider Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man xii (Free
Press 1992).
22
Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133, codified at 47 USC §§ 223, 230, 303, 560-61, 609. See
Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 874 (1997).
23
Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (1998), codified at 47 USC § 231. See Ashcroft v
ACLU, 542 US 656, 666 (2004).
24
Polk Wagner makes a similar distinction between direct and indirect censorship. See
R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 Minn L Rev 755, 771-72, 777-78 (1999).
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analyzed by scholars or courts, leaving the state with considerable
freedom of action. The Article argues that soft censorship is less legitimate than hard censorship-its methods are not as transparent,
open, narrow, or accountable as statutory schemes that specifically
address online content control. It is thus worrisome that the government's power to censor the Internet is strongest where it is least legitimate.
This Article is the first to offer a theoretical account of seemingly unrelated measures as a coherent government effort to control Internet content. Previous scholarship has only explored individual aspects of soft censorship, without recognizing their larger implications
for an American system of online restraints. For example, Seth
Kreimer discusses state efforts to enlist intermediaries to engage in
censorship by proxy.25 Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley set out a
framework for when deputizing intermediaries is sensible,26 as do
Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner." Candice Spurlin and Patrick
Garry empirically assess the effects of the inducement provided by
the Children's Internet Protection Act28 (CIPA) for filtering on library patrons' access to information. 29 Tim Wu writes a defense of
agencies' use of threats in place of formal rulemaking or enforcement through adjudication. 0 Annemarie Bridy discusses the market
changes pushing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers into a willingness to engage in copyright enforcement via private ordering, particularly through filtering and user disconnection.31
This Article argues these methods form a set of tools that the state
can, and does, employ to block disfavored information with minimal
constraint.
The Article next advances a controversial proposition: if hard
censorship is more legitimate than soft, and society determines that
25
See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The FirstAmendment, Internet Intermediaries,and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U Pa L Rev 11, 22-33 (2006).
26
See Ronald J. Mann and Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 Wm & Mary L Rev 239, 265-75 (2005) (arguing for a gatekeeper regime under which
no-fault liability is imposed on Internet intermediaries as least cost avoiders).
27
See Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 S Ct Econ Rev 221, 233-40 (2006).
28
Pub L No 106-554, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-335 (2000), codified at 20 USC §§ 6801, 6777,
9134 and 47 USC § 254.
29
See Candice J. Spurlin and Patrick M. Garry, Does FilteringStop the Flow of Valuable
Information?: A Case Study of the Children'sInternet Protection Act (CIPA) in South Dakota,
54 SD L Rev 89, 92-96 (2009).
30
See Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 Duke L J 1841, 1848-52 (2011).
31
See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in
Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 Or L Rev 81, 102-03, 105, 120, 124-25 (2010).
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government should prevent access to certain materials, then the federal government should pass and implement a statutory scheme for
online censorship. The Article outlines key elements that would
make such a statute legitimate.3 2 It is not clear that censorship should
occur. Rather, it is clear that it is occurring. If America decides to
block access to pieces of the Net, this Article contends that it should
do so in a way that is open, transparent, narrowly targeted, and protective of key normative commitments such as open communication,
equal treatment under the law, and due process.
Finally, the Article also engages a larger scholarly debate about
the proper role of government in shaping a profoundly important
public space for communication-the Internet-that is primarily
owned by private actors. The debate over the proper regulatory role
of the state regarding information on the Net is a contentious one. In
particular, scholars disagree vehemently over the merits and lawfulness of net neutrality rules and of government efforts to shape online
content. Susan Crawford contends that communications policy
should optimize the transmission of online communications rather
than focusing on particular Internet layers or infrastructure providers, as a means of achieving "[t]he greatest possible diversity of new
ideas."33 In opposition, Daniel Lyons asserts that net neutrality obli-

gations would take ISPs' property without compensation, effecting
an unconstitutional taking.34 Marvin Ammori argues for diminished

scrutiny when government seeks to promote democratic content.
Hannibal Travis wants the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to employ structural rules to ensure informational diversity. 31
This Article argues that the creativity of the American government's
censorship efforts supports stringent review of state regulation of
online information. Soft censorship has much to teach about the

32
Previously, I developed a process-based methodology to assess censorship's legitimacy. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 Duke L J 377, 390-410 (2009) (proposing that
censorship practices be evaluated along metrics of "openness, transparency, narrowness,
and accountability").
33
Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Projectof Communications Law, 55 UCLA L
Rev 359, 365, 375-90 (2007).
34
See Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to
Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 Notre Dame L Rev 65, 92-114 (2011).
35
See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: UnderstandingContent-Based Promotion of DemocraticSpeech, 61 Fed Comm L J 273, 303-19 (2009).
36
See Hannibal Travis, The FCC's New Theory of the FirstAmendment, 51 Santa Clara
L Rev 417, 431-43 (2011) (substantiating a narrative in which the repeal of media neutrality
regulation in the late 1980s precipitated a "'dark age' of deregulation and conglomerate control" that has severely constrained the heterogeneity of individual media consumption).
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legitimacy of governmental actions that seek to shape Internet
discourse.
The Article proceeds in five parts. First, it catalogues the censor's toolkit, providing an account of the methods by which state and
federal governments can interdict content of which they disapprove.
In the process, it distinguishes between hard and soft methods of
censorship. Second, it subjects these methods to searching, processbased analysis of their legitimacy. Third, it evaluates the constraints
upon these indirect tools, recasting the New Chicago School model
of regulatory modalities as a means of resisting regulation.37 Fourth,
it makes a controversial and likely unpopular proposal: hard censorship is normatively preferable to soft censorship. A properly crafted
statute allowing the government to block certain unlawful content
would be legitimate, although not necessarily sensible. It would align
Internet censorship with precedent on prior restraint in other media.
Lastly, this Article explores how soft Internet censorship offers lessons for how American legal doctrine and scholarship should evaluate the state's role in shaping public discourse in the private medium
of the Internet. This Article is concerned not with Orwell's Room
101, with its overt control over communication, but instead with Orwell's Armchair, where the state eases people8 into a censored environment through softer, more indirect means.1
I. THE CENSOR'S TOOLKIT

A nation-state that wants to censor the Internet has five options:
direct control, deputizing intermediaries, pretext, payment, and persuasion. These methods range from pure government action and
responsibility to almost completely private action. This Article classifies the two techniques with the greatest governmental role-direct
control and deputizing intermediaries -as hard censorship. Here,
the state imposes its content preferences directly, either by
implementation through computer code39 or by force of law.' ° The other

three methods-pretext-based censorship via orthogonally related laws,
paying for filtered access, and persuasion through pressure-are classified as soft censorship. There, the state's intervention is far less visible
and direct, and might be formally easier to evade-though, as the Arti-

See generally Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J Legal Stud 661 (1998).
George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four184 (Harcourt 1949).
39
Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 4-8 (Perseus 2006) (suggesting that "the software
and hardware.. . that make cyberspace what it is also regulate cyberspace as it is").
40
See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L J 1601, 1613 (1986).
37
38
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cle demonstrates, less so in practice. This Part first defines censorship in
the Internet context and then explores each option.
A. Censorship as Prior Restraint
For this Article, censorship occurs when a government prevents
communication between a willing speaker and a willing listener
through interdiction rather than through post-communication sanctions. Filtering is a specific type of censorship, where the state uses
technological methods to identify and block prohibited content. This
usage of "censorship" is normatively neutral: the state censors equally when it seizes child pornography shipped via the postal service"
and when it employs software to block access to a labor union's website on a Wi-Fi network. 2 Censorship is thus one means of increasing
the cost of disfavored information. There are others: criminal sanctions for producing or consuming material, 43 taxes upon t 44 or campaigns to drive social disapprobation for it. 45 Importantly, censorship
is not binary, where information is either completely blocked or
freely available: a state can succeed by raising the effective price of
contraband information sufficiently. Indeed, even hard censorship
cannot filter perfectly. China's system of Internet censorship, popularly known as the Great Firewall, can be breached by users with sufficient technical skill and yet is highly effective in controlling the information available to most Chinese citizens. 6 Thus, censorship (as
used in this Article) describes a process where a state uses ex ante
measures to make information more difficult or expensive to access,
with the goal of preventing its consumption or distribution.
Ordinarily, the term "censorship" carries a pejorative connotation. It is particularly loaded in American scholarly and political discourse, where censorship is seen as anathema to deeply held beliefs

See, for example, United States v Rabe, 848 F2d 994, 996-97 (9th Cir 1988).
See, for example, Pro-union Website Blocked in Wisconsin Capitol (CNN Feb 22,
2011), online at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-22/us/wisconsin.budget-lwebsite-unions
-access (visited Sept 20, 2012).
43
See, for example, 18 USC § 1466A(a) (criminalizing the production, distribution, receipt, and possession of child sexual abuse images); 18 USC § 1832(a) (criminalizing the
trafficking in trade secrets); 18 USC § 793 (criminalizing the same for national defense
information).
See, for example, Arkansas Writers' Project,Inc v Ragland, 481 US 221, 227 (1987).
45
See, for example, Department of Health and Human Services, Cyberbullying (Mar 8,
2012), online at http://www.stopbullying.gov/topics/cyberbullying (visited Sept 20, 2012).
46
See James Fallows, "The Connection Has Been Reset," The Atlantic 64, 69
(Mar 2008).
41
42
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about the importance of unfettered discourse and free expression.47
Yet America's normative commitment to open communication contains exceptions. Even the Supreme Court has permitted a state government to censor by seizing material in advance of a judicial determination as to whether it was unlawful.8 The Court emphasized,
rightly, the procedural safeguards included in the scheme rather than
treating seizures as per se impermissible.49 America, like every other

country, views some material as sufficiently harmful to warrant
blocking. And like most countries, America prefers not to describe
such blocking as censorship. Each state balances freedom of expres-

sion against other values differently, leading to incommensurable
definitions of what constitutes censorship. 0 For Americans, filtering
file-sharing sites does not qualify as censorship," but filtering politically oriented52 or pornographic sites53 does. For South Korean citi-

zens, though, filtering pornographic sites or politically oriented material that praises North Korea does not count as censorship, ' but
blocking file-sharing sites does.5 Norms vary. Every country assumes
that its own views on content restrictions are not only defensible, but
natural.

47
See, for example, Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 131 S Ct 2653, 2664 (2011) (holding
"[l]awmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance than
by censoring its content"); Bantam Books, Inc v Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70 (1963) (stating
that "[any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity"). See also John Fee, The Pornographic
Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 Ala L Rev 291, 302 (2009) (writing that "[cilassifying some
kinds of speech as 'low value' for constitutional purposes is a dangerous exercise, for it
risks the suppression of speech that the majority of society does not appreciate").
49
See Kingsley Books, Inc v Brown, 354 US 436, 438-39, 441 (1957).
49
Id at 441-44.
50
See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structureof Scientific Revolutions 148 (Chicago 3d ed 1996)
(defining incommensurability as a term used to describe the circumstance where disputants
"disagree about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must solve").
51
See, for example, Mitch Bainwol, Support for PROTECT IP Piles Up, Music Notes
Blog (RIAA May 26, 2011), online at http://www.riaa.com/blog.php?content-selector=riaanews-blog&blog-selector=Support-For-PROTECT-IP (visited Sept 20, 2012); Floyd Abrams:
PROTECT IP Act Does Not Violate FirstAmendment (American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists May 24, 2011), online at http://aftra.org/69A98E28C25B42DCA66AED
619E4D2084.htm (visited Sept 20, 2012).
52
See, for example, Pro-union Website Blocked in Wisconsin Capitol (cited in note 42).
53
See Ashcroft v ACLU, 542 US 656, 666 (2004) (affirming a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of COPA, a law aimed at curtailing minors' access to pornography).
5
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: South Korea *303-04 (2011), online at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inlineimages/South%2KoreaFOTN2011.pdf
(visited Sept 20, 2012).
55
See Mike Masnick, Kicking People off the Internet Not Enough in South Korea, Copyright Lobbyists Demand More (Techdirt Nov 19, 2009), online at http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20091117/1154046972.shtml (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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The virtue of this Article's more technical definition of censorship is that it concentrates upon the method a government uses
to control information and defers analysis of the legitimacy of such
measures to a separate step. The alternative is to be drawn into
absurdity, such as classifying the removal of sites that facilitate intellectual property (IP) infringement as mere enforcement of property
rights but removal of sites that report on human rights
as censorship. 6 Censorship thus becomes a descriptive term; normative conclusions require rigorous analysis of each particular
censorship regime.
I have previously argued that the legitimacy of censorship is best
judged by the processes through which a state arrives at blocking decisions. 7 In particular, legitimacy depends on four factors: whether
blocking is openly described, transparent in what content it targets,
narrow and effective in what it actually filters, and accountable via
formal or informal processes to the users it purports to protect.
Censorship is more likely to be legitimate when a government openly admits it blocks access to material, describes clearly what content
it filters, targets prohibited information precisely, and arrives at decisions through accountable mechanisms of governance.
An implicit consequence of using this process-based methodology to evaluate Internet censorship is that some filtering regimes will
be judged legitimate. I have argued that the provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act59 (DMCA) that press intermediaries to
censor in return for immunity from copyright liability should be
viewed as justified under this framework. 60 This conclusion and the
concomitant result that Internet censorship can be legitimate are
controversial and have been criticized by scholars such as Milton
Mueller. 6' However, it is helpful simply to note that this Article does
not consider the efforts to restrict content that it describes as automatically suspect. It seeks to identify whether there are problems
with how government engages in censorship rather than rejecting information control altogether.

56
See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 384-86 (cited in note 32) (documenting the "scant
agreement on what material ought to be off-limits" and concluding that "[clomparing nations'
online censorship from one normative perspective is unhelpful").
57
See id.
58
See id at 386-87.
59
Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (2000), codified at 17 USC §§ 512, 1201-05.
60
See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 401 (cited in note 32).
61
Milton L. Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance
206-08 (MIT 2010).
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In many cases, censorship is surprisingly acceptable to people.62
Users do not automatically flee, or oppose, censored communication
platforms. Indeed, consumers are surprisingly comfortable with filtered information environments. Apple's iPhone, for example, holds
25 to 30 percent of the smartphone market in the United States6 3 despite the fact that the company carefully censors which applications
are available on its phones. Similarly, Apple removed an app named
"Thirdlntifada" from its App Store because it was "offensive to large
groups of people"' and infamously banned Pulitzer Prize-winning
6
cartoonist Mark Fiore's app because it "ridicule[d] public figures., 1
Other popular Internet platforms similarly exclude disfavored
information. By default, Google employs its SafeSearch technology,

which excludes sexually explicit images and videos from search results. 6 While users can easily alter the SafeSearch settings-making
them either stricter or more lenient-behavioral economics scholarship demonstrates the power of default settings. 67 Bing, Microsoft's

search engine, similarly sets a default of using SafeSearch at its

moderate setting. 8 YouTube removes videos that involve sexually
explicit content, graphic violence, hate speech, animal abuse, and
61
drug abuse.69 Most e-mail
service providers block spam.70

62
See, for example, Craig A. Depken II, Who Supports Internet Censorship? (First
Monday Sept 4, 2006), online at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fn/
article/view/1390/1308 (visited Sept 20, 2012) (analyzing the results of an online survey on Internet censorship in which more than 46 percent of respondents agreed with such censorship
in principle).
63
See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Needham: Android's Market Share Peaked in March, Apple 2.0 (CNNMoney Jun 21, 2011), online at http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/21/needham
-androids-market-share-peaked-in-march (visited Sept 20, 2012) (citing a Needham & Co estimate of 29.5 percent market share for the first quarter of 2011); Henry Blodget, Android Is
Destroying Everyone, Especially RIM-iPhone Dead in Water (Bus Insider Apr 2, 2011),
online at http://www.businessinsider.com/android-iphone-market-share-2011-4 (visited Sept 20,
2012) (citing a Comscore estimate of 25.2 percent for the same period).
64
Apple Removes Anti-Israel 'Thirdlntifada' App from App Store (Huffington Post
June 22, 2011), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/23/apple-removes-anti-israel
-thirdintifada-app-n_.882857.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
65
Laura McGann, Mark Fiore Can Win a Pulitzer Prize, but He Can't Get His iPhone
Cartoon App Past Apple's Satire Police, Nieman Journalism Lab (Nieman Foundation Apr 5,
2010), online at http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/04/mark-fiore-can-win-a-pulitzer-prize-but-he
-cant-get-his-iphone-cartoon-app-past-apples-satire-police (visited Sept 20, 2012).
66
See Google Help, SafeSearch: Filter Objectionable Content, online at
http://support.google.com/websearch/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=510&topic=1678515&ctx
=topic (visited Sept 20, 2012).
67
See id. See also Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
about Health, Wealth, and Happiness 85-87 (Yale 2008) (discussing default settings).
68
See Bing Help, Block Explicit Websites, online at http://onlinehelp.microsoft.com/en
-USfbing/ff808441.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012).
69
See YouTube Community Guidelines, online at http://www.youtube.com/t/
community-guidelines (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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The prevalence of bowdlerized information platforms has important consequences for soft censorship. America's shared belief in
free expression suggests that users would doggedly resist the imposi-

tion of filtering. Yet the evidence predicts a much more muted response. Americans love the iPhone and use Google with such regularity that the search engine's name has become a verb." Censorship that
is sufficiently subtle is likely to be accepted, even if only grudgingly.

Having defined its use of censorship, the Article now explores
each modality in detail.
B.

Direct Control
Chesterfield, Virginia, is a county south of Richmond that offers

residents and visitors the Metro Richmond Zoo, a NASCAR speed-

way, Virginia State University, and free wireless Internet access. 72
Anyone can surf the Web using Chesterfield's Citizen Wi-Fi, provided they do not want pornography.73 The county does not provide ac-

cess to the entire Internet from Citizen Wi-Fi: Chesterfield employs
the Websense Internet-filtering software to block access to "graphic
pornography," as defined by Websense's "adult material" content
category. 74 Websense's "Adult Material" category includes not only
graphic pornography but also material on sex education, lingerie,

swimsuits, and sexuality." Chesterfield offers Internet users a choice:
access the Internet for free, at the cost of being blocked from speech

that the county government dislikes or pay for unfiltered access.76

70
See, for example, Holomaxx Technologies Corp v Microsoft Corp, 2011 WL 3740813,
*4 (ND Cal).
2012), online at
71
See, for example, Merriam-Webster (Merriam-Webster

http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/google (visited Sept 20, 2012).
72
See Chesterfield County, Tourism and Leisure: Tourism and Leisure- Visit Chesterfield, online at http://www.chesterfield.gov/visitors.aspx?id=3019 (visited Sept 20, 2012) (detailing the pleasures of Chesterfield); Chesterfield County, Connected Government. Citizen Wiat
http://www.chesterfield.gov/
Asked
Questions,
online
Fi-Frequently
connectedgovernment.aspx?id=2086 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
73
See Chesterfield County, Connected Government: Citizen Wi-Fi-Access to Free,
Wireless Internet Is as Easy as Opening a Laptop!, online at http://www.chesterfield.gov/
connectedgovernment.aspx?id=2083 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
74
Acceptable-Use Policy, online at http://www.chesterfield.gov/WorkAreallinkit.aspx?
Linkldentifier=id&ItemlD=10156 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
75
Websense, URL Categories: Accurate, Current, and Comprehensive, online at
http://www.websense.com/contentlURLCategories.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012). Chesterfield
blocks the Sex subcategory but not Lingerie and Swimsuit, Nudity, or Sex Education. See
E-mail from Barry Condrey, Chief Information Officer of Chesterfield County (June 29, 2011)
(on file with author).
76
Chesterfield seeks to "eliminate access 'to materials that constitute obscenity or child
pornography, materials harmful to juveniles, or materials that create a sexually harassing envi-
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Chesterfield's direct provision of censored Internet access is increasingly common. Culver City in California-home to three movie
studios-provides free Wi-Fi that blocks peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing applications." Utah Transit Authority's express buses offer
wireless access to commuters but filter "offensive sites.,18 Houston's
municipal Wi-Fi network blocks both adults and minors from reaching material that is obscene, constitutes child pornography, or is

harmful to minors." Boston filtered its public wireless network until
funding problems forced it offline.80
Direct control is a potent form of hard censorship. Its success,
though, depends on the architecture of a country's networks, which
can result either from deliberate design decisions or from path dependency. History matters. Saudi Arabia and China exemplify the
capabilities of hard censorship through direct control. In Saudi Arabia, all Internet traffic passes through a single point-a group of
proxy servers-that acts as the locus for censorship. 8' A government
agency, the Communications and Information Technology Commission, holds responsibility for blocking content, and the Saudi Telecom Company, which is owned by the state, is the primary access and
network provider.82 Similarly, China performs its Internet filtering
using routers at the backbone of the network, which is state owned.83
With direct control, governmental responsibility for censorship is
immediate, obvious, and singular. The state imposes content deci-

ronment,' which are illegal or inappropriate." Chesterfield County, Acceptable-Use Policy (cited in note 74).
77
See Karl Bode, LA Muni-Fi Filters Smut, P2P: Audible Magic Gear at the MPAA's
Request... (Broadband Reports Aug 23, 2006), online at http://www.broadbandreports.com/
shownews/77538 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
78
Utah Transit Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, online at http://www.rideuta.com/
mc/?page=RidingUTA-Amenities-Wirelesslnternet-FAQs (visited Sept 20, 2012).
79
Houston Public Library, City of Houston, and WeCAN Houston, Digital Inclusion
Initiative Frequently Asked Questions 10 (May 21, 2008), online at http://www.uh.edu/hcpp/
DigitallnclusionlnitiativeFAQ.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
80
See Danny Weitzner, City of Boston Censoring Municipal WiFi (Apr 24, 2007), online
at http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/188 (visited Sept 20, 2012); lonut Arghire, After
Municipal Wi-Fi Network Fail, Boston Settles for Hotspot Patchwork (Softpedia Apr 19, 2008),
online at http://news.softpedia.com/news/After-Municipal-Wi-Fi-Network-Fail-Boston-Settles
-For-Hotspot-Patchwork-83845.shtml (visited Sept 20, 2012).
81
Ronald Deibert, et al, eds, Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule
in Cyberspace 561-70 (MIT 2010).
82
See generally OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filteringin Saudi Arabia (Aug 6, 2009), online at
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONISaudiArabia_2009.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
83
See OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study 3-4
(Apr
14,
2005),
online
at
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONIChina
_CountryStudy.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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sions by creating a choke point for access that it controls and then
implementing filtering at that point.
In the United States, significant direct control by state actors is
unlikely for architectural reasons. Most of the relevant Internet infrastructure in America, such as the network backbone, routers, and
access points, is privately owned and operated. During the Internet's

early development, the primary infrastructure-first the Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network, and then the National Science
Foundation Network-was owned by the federal government, but
the administration of President Bill Clinton made a deliberate deci-

sion to privatize the network backbone in 1995. ' Internet access to
homes and residences is provided almost exclusively by private firms

offering Internet service via digital subscriber line (DSL), cable modem, satellite, or wireless telephone services. 8 Thus, while federal
and state governments provide some publicly available access points,

most users obtain Internet access over privately held networks.
However, the emergence of publicly provided Internet accesstypically hailed as a boon that can close America's digital divide 86 -

ironically poses risks to open Internet communication. Government
has nearly free rein in deciding what content to permit or deny when
it supplies the medium.87 This power is profound: there is no differ-

ence in principle between censoring speech on topics of political debate such as abortion and censoring political speech directly. A gov-

ernment that can forbid counseling on abortion in state-funded
clinics," and forbid access to material "harmful to minors" on its Internet services,8 9 can just as readily block content related to foreign

policy choicesi 0 It is not clear that there are constitutional constraints
on the government's ability to filter publicly provided Internet access,
only political ones. For example, while there have been lawsuits

84
85

See Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society 46 (Wiley-Blackwell 2d ed 2010).
Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, FCC, In-

ternet Access Services: Status as of June 30, 2010 (Mar 2011), online at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-305296A1.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
86
See, for example, Jan Chipchase, Is Internet Access a Human Right?, CNN.com Blogs
(CNN July 14, 2011), online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2Oll/07/14/ls-internet
-access-a-human-right (visited Sept 20, 2012).
87
See Part III.B.
88
See Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 192-200 (1991).
89
20 USC § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) (forbidding the grant of funds to any library that does not
have in place a policy of "technology protection" for Internet-enabled computers that protects
against access to visual depictions that are "harmful to minors"). See United States v American
Library Association, Inc, 539 US 194, 203-09 (2003).
90
See Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, NY Times at A16 (cited in note 14) (reporting
on allegations that a travel site was banned for facilitating tourism in Cuba).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:863

against schools that block material based on its viewpoint, such as
support for gay and lesbian students, none has resulted in a decision
on the merits.9 ' While this may demonstrate a consensus that such
discrimination is unlawful, it more likely results from school districts'
unwillingness to devote scarce funds to litigation or to endure scrutiny over alleged bias against a group of their students. Similarly, politically based funding that restricts information has been found constitutional. Such restrictions include Title X grants prohibiting abortion
counseling,' arts funding requiring respect for "general standards
of decency,"93 and international HIV funding banning promotion
of abortion.94 Direct provision of Internet access by government
comes at a cost: one may be able to reach only speech of which the
state approves.
Thus, while history prevents America from using direct control,
a form of hard censorship, to filter the majority of Internet access, it
remains a potent tool where available.
C.

Deputizing Intermediaries

Alaska decided to replay history. The state's legislature passed a
bill that banned the distribution of indecent material to minors, and
Governor Sean Parnell signed it into law." ISPs, among others,
would have faced liability under the law." The statute was strikingly
similar not only to the provisions of two federal laws invalidated by
the Supreme Court' but also to a series of state laws struck down as
violations of the First Amendment.98 And, as in each prior case, a
federal court permanently enjoined Alaska's law from being enforced. The district court in Alaska noted that it was unclear whether

91
Consider Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Nominal Damages, Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Inc v Camdenton R-!Il School District, No 2:11-cv-04212, *1 (WD Mo filed Aug 15, 2011), online at http://www.aclu.org/files/
assets/pflagcomplaint.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
92
See Rust, 500 US at 178-81.
93
20 USC § 954(d)(1). See National Endowment for the Arts v Finley, 524 US 569,
590 (1998).
94
Centerfor Reproductive Law and Policy v Bush, 304 F3d 183,186 (2d Cir 2002).
95
See Alaska Stat Ann § 11.61.128(a) (criminalizing the knowing distribution of certain
material harmful to minors if the recipient was under 16 years of age); Chris Klint, Federal
Judge Blocks State Anti-Child-Porn Law (KTUU July 1, 2011), online at http://www.ktuu.com/
news/ktuu-federal-judge-blocks-state-anti-child-porn-law-070111,0,472573.story
(visited Sept
20, 2012) (tracing the bill's history).
96
See Alaska Stat Ann § 11.61.125(d).
97
See Ashcroft, 542 US at 666; Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 874, 885 (1997).
98
See American Booksellers Foundationfor Free Expression v Sullivan, 799 F Supp 2d
1078, 1080-81 (D Alaska 2011) (listing cases).
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the law required knowledge that a recipient was underage but that

even if it did, there are "no reasonable technological means that enable a speaker on the Internet to ascertain the actual age of persons
who access their communications."' 99 Thus, the statute created a risk
that adult Internet users would limit their expression only to what
was suitable for minors, a harm deemed constitutionally impermissible by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances.10

The outcome of the suit against Alaska's statute appeared obvious: the law was quite similar to §223 of the CDA, which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1997.1 Nonetheless, Alaska enacted

the statute, and defended it, in a seemingly (and ultimately) fruitless
effort. Yet Alaska is in good company: six other states have had similar laws invalidated since the Court ruled on the CDA.12 Both state
and federal governments have remained eager to mandate that intermediaries carry out filtering of disfavored content, on pain of civil
or criminal sanctions despite the consistently skeptical attitude of reviewing courts.1 3
The second method of censorship is where government deputizes key intermediaries to perform filtering via public law regulation.

This step-also a form of hard censorship-has been the most obvious and popular regulatory response in the US to perceived problems of harmful content online. The federal government twice
enacted legislation that would have compelled ISPs and other inter-

mediaries to block material deemed harmful to minors, once as the
CDA1 °4 and once as COPA. l5 In each case, the ACLU challenged the
99
Id at 1081-82.
100
See id, citing Reno, 521 US at 876.
101
See Reno, 521 US at 860, 885 (overturning then-current 47 USC § 223(d)). Section
223(d) criminalized using an interactive computer service, such as the Internet, to display patently offensive material concerning sex or excretion in a manner available to people under the
age of eighteen. Alaska's law criminalized knowing distribution, including on the Internet, of
material harmful to minors if the recipient was under the age of sixteen. The statute is also similar to § 231 of COPA, which criminalized knowingly posting, for commercial purposes, Web
material that was harmful to minors. See Ashcroft, 542 US at 661-62, 666 (overturning thencurrent 47 USC § 231(a)(1)).
102
Sullivan, 799 F Supp 2d at 1080-81 (listing cases). See also American LibrariesAssociation v Pataki,969 F Supp 160, 183-84 (SDNY 1997) (striking down a similar New York statute on Commerce Clause grounds in the same year that Reno was decided).
103
The only state statute to survive scrutiny is that of Ohio and then only because the
state narrowed its interpretation of the law to cover only "personally directed communication
between an adult and a person that the adult knows or should know is a minor." American
Booksellers Foundationfor Free Expression v Strickland,601 F3d 622, 628 (6th Cir 2010) (upholding Ohio Rev Code § 2907.31(D) against First Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges). Generally available Internet content, such as a web page, would not run afoul of the
Ohio statute.
104
See 47 USC § 223 (1996), abrogated by Reno, 521 US at 885.
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law on constitutional grounds and succeeded-once because the law
was deemed overbroad 0 6 and once because the Supreme Court
viewed end-user filtering technology as a less restrictive alternative.0 While these decisions would seem to foreclose legally man-

dated filtering, bills that require Internet censorship are hardy congressional perennials. For example, in the 111th Congress, Senator
Patrick Leahy proposed legislation entitled Combating Online In-

fringement and Counterfeits Act," s which passed the Judiciary

Committee but not the Senate itself. Representative Paul Kanjorski
introduced a bill that would have required ISPs to filter material re° Similarly, in the 112th Congress, Senator
lated to brokerage fraud.'O
Leahy and nine other senators introduced the Preventing Real

Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act of 2011 " 0 (PROTECT IP Act), which unanimously
passed the Senate Judiciary Committee."'
State governments have also attempted to mandate filtering. In
2009, Minnesota sought to require ISPs to prevent customers from

accessing gambling sites. The state reversed course after a gambling
interest group challenged the regulations in court as violations of the
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause."2 In 2002, Pennsylvania required ISPs to block sites designated by the state attorney general as offering child pornography. 3 The result-blocking over 1.1
million sites to prevent access to roughly 400 with unlawful
material-was found to be unconstitutional by a federal court as a
violation of both the First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce
Clause."4 Alaska, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, South Caroli-

105
106

107
101

109

See 47 USC § 231 (1996 & Supp 1998), abrogated by Ashcroft, 542 Us at 666.
See Reno, 521 US at 885.
See Ashcroft, 542 US at 666.
S 3804, 111th Cong, 2d Sess, in 156 Cong Rec S 7207 (Sept 20, 2010).
Investor Protection Act of 2009, HR 3817, 111th Cong, 1st Sess, in 155 Cong Rec H

11456 (Oct 15, 2009).
110 S 968, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S 2936 (May 12, 2011).
III
Greg Sandoval, Senate Panel OKs Controversial Antipiracy Bill (CNET May 26,
2011), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001-3-20066456-261.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
112
See Complaint and Demand for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Interactive Media
Entertainment & Gaming Association v Willems, No 0:09CV01065, *16, 18-19 (D Minn filed
May 6, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 456360) ("Willems Complaint"). Poker Players Alliance, Poker Players Alliance Declares Victory in Minnesota (June 4, 2009), online at
http://theppa.org/press-releases/2009/06/04/mn-poker-players-alliance-declares-victory-in
-minnesota-060409 (visited Sept 20, 2012) (celebrating Minnesota's decision to reverse course
on Internet gambling).
113
See Center for Democracy & Technology v Pappert,337 F Supp 2d 606, 619-21 (ED
Pa 2004).
114
See id at 655, 658, 660, 662.
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na, Vermont, and Virginia all promulgated legislation similar to the
CDA or COPA, and all had their laws blocked by similar First
Amendment challenges.11' Lawmakers are persistent. Thus, US states
that attempt to impose filtering mandates on Internet intermediaries
face not only First Amendment challenges but also limits based on
the effects of such laws on interstate commerce, a zone constitutionally reserved to Congress."6
The key check on governmental attempts to use legal regulation
to bind intermediaries, such as ISPs, to perform censorship has been
the protection for free speech under the First Amendment. Filtering
laws face at least two First Amendment hurdles: describing prohibited content with sufficient precision" 7 and showing that censorshipdisfavored prior restraint-is the best-tailored method of achieving
the state's goals."' These barriers are formidable and greatly foreclose governmental attempts to formally devolve responsibility for
censorship onto intermediaries for the foreseeable future." 9
However, legislators can refine filtering laws to make them
more likely to withstand scrutiny. The first adjustment is to target
only content that is plainly unlawful. Both the CDA and COPA faltered here; the CDA banned both "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications, 2 ' and COPA aimed at material that was
"patently offensive with respect to minors" and lacked "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.' 2' In both cases,
the Supreme Court found the bans overbroad because they trod up115
116

See Sullivan, 799 F Supp 2d at 1080-81.
Consider Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333,

348-54 (1977).
See Reno, 521 US at 874.
117
118
See, for example, ACLU v Mukasey, 534 F3d 181, 190 (3d Cir 2008).
119
As a practical matter, the current Supreme Court appears to be highly speech protective. Countervailing considerations such as protecting minors from video game violence, reducing prescription drug costs, preventing emotional harm to the families of American soldiers
killed in combat, or improving access to media by less well-funded political candidates were
held insufficient to justify speech restrictions in the October Term 2010 alone. See Arizona
Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v Bennett, 131 S Ct 2806, 2824, 2828-29 (2011)
(holding that an Arizona statute providing for public election financing pegged to private election financing imposes an unconstitutional burden on the speech of private candidates and
their financers); Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S Ct 2729, 2742 (2011)
(holding that a California law restricting minors' access to violent video games is unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Sorrell, 131 S Ct at 2659, 267 (holding the same for a Vermont statute prohibiting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records revealing doctors'
prescribing practices); Snyder v Phelps, 131 S Ct 1207, 1220 (2011) (holding that a protest near
the funeral of a soldier was entitled to protection under the First Amendment from tort liability). This trend likely decreases further the chance that federal filtering legislation would survive judicial scrutiny.
120
See Reno, 521 US at 859-61.
121
See Ashcroft, 542 US at 661-62, quoting 47 USC § 231(e)(6).
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on speech that was lawful for adults. Reducing the scope of prohibitprefer
ed content will be unpalatable12 for legislators, who frequently
,123
or material
to target pornography, 22 content "harmful to minors,
supporting terrorist groups.124 But, focusing only on content that is
clearly unlawful-such as child pornography, obscenity, or intellectual property infringement -has constitutional benefits that can help
a statute survive. These categories of material do not count as speech
for First Amendment analysis, and hence the government need not
satisfy strict scrutiny in attacking them.12 5 Recent bills seem to show
that legislators have learned this lesson-the PROTECT IP Act, for
example, targets only those websites with "no significant use other
than engaging in, enabling, or facilitating" IP infringement.'26 Banning only unprotected material could move censorial legislation past
overbreadth objections.
Additionally, censorship laws would need to show that they do
not sweep too much protected speech into the cybersieves along with
unprotected information. When Pennsylvania required ISPs in the
state to prevent access to child pornography sites, for example, the
ISPs blocked traffic to those sites' IP addresses. The providers
claimed that retrofitting their networks to engage in more finely
tuned filtering methods, such as URL-based blocking, would be prohibitively expensive. 27 The consequence of targeting IP addresses

was that roughly 1.1 million unrelated sites were filtered along with
about 400 that allegedly hosted child porn-or, approximately 2,700

lawful sites blocked for each unlawful one. Unsurprisingly, a federal
district court found this massive overblocking burdened "substantial-

122
See, for example, Michael O'Brien, Bachmann, Santorum Sign onto Social Conservative Pledge, The Hill's Blog Briefing Room (The Hill July 8, 2011), online at
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/170471-bachmann-santorum-sign-onto-social
-conservative-pledge (visited Sept 20, 2012).
123
Sullivan, 799 F Supp 2d at 1079, quoting Alaska Stat Ann § 11.61.128.
124
See, for example, Elizabeth M. Renieris, Note, CombatingIncitement to Terrorism on

the Internet: Comparative Approaches in the United States and United Kingdom and the Need
for an InternationalSolution, 11 Vand J Enter & Tech L 673, 682-85 (2009); Thomas Claburn,
Senator Lieberman Wants Terrorist Videos Removed from YouTube (InformationWeek May
20, 2008), online at http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/google/207801148 (visited
Sept 20, 2012).
125
See, for example, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539,
555-60 (1985) (suggesting that copyright infringement can overshadow First Amendment
rights); New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 765 (1982) (holding that a New York law covering
child pornography "describes a category of material the production and distribution of which is
not entitled to First Amendment protection"); Miller v California,413 US 15, 23 (1973) (reaffirming that material classified as obscenity is "unprotected by the First Amendment").
126
PROTECT IP Act § 2, in 157 Cong Rec at S 2937 (cited in note 110).
127
See Pappert,337 F Supp 2d at 630.
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ly more protected material than [was] essential" to the government's
goal of interdicting child pornography.'28
Technology, though, has progressed significantly since Pennsylvania's statute was struck down in 2004. ISPs increasingly use sophisticated monitoring techniques, such as deep-packet inspection, to
calibrate network performance, monitor for malware, and differenti129
ate among types of content to implement quality of service. 12 Providers can distinguish BitTorrent content from Web content, and
from VoIP phone calls. As ISPs increasingly deploy cheaper and
more sophisticated network equipment, courts may look more favorably upon legal rules that require them to use their new tools to filter
unlawful material." ° The costs of filtering have fallen, and its
effectiveness - ISPs' ability to block prohibited material, and only
that material-has risen. Overblocking will likely be less of a
hurdle for future filtering legislation, both in constitutional and
technological terms.
In short, while First Amendment precedent limits significantly
the state's ability to compel intermediaries to censor, technological
progress and legislative restraint could enable government to
deputize intermediaries.
D.

Pretext

Blame the Kentucky Derby.
In September 2008, the Commonwealth of Kentucky sought to
have 141 domain names for gambling sites, such as AbsolutePoker.com
and PokerStars.com, transferred to the state's control. The sites operate, and their domain names are registered, outside Kentucky; indeed,
most are outside the United States altogether. Defending the move,
Governor Steve Beshear argued that "[u]nlicensed, unregulated, illegal Internet gambling poses a tremendous threat to the citizens of the
Commonwealth," necessitating the seizure.' In reality, the state
worried that online gambling would undercut revenue from horse rac-

Id at 655.
L Rev 1417,
See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U IIU
1432-36 (2009); Bridy, 89 Or L Rev at 102-05, 120-25 (cited in note 31).
130
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131
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Press Release, Kentucky Seizes Domain Names of
Illegal Internet Gambling Sites (Sept 22, 2008), online at http://migration.kentucky.gov/
newsroom/governor/20080922onlinegaming.htm (visited Sept 20, 2012).
128
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ing and offline gambling;"' gambling interests were major contributors
to the Governor's political campaign.

Kentucky cited its gambling regulations as legal authority for
the move."M Under Kentucky law, any illegal gambling device can be
forfeited to the state.

The statute defines gambling devices either

as "[a]ny so-called slot machine or any other machine or mechanical
device an essential part of which is a drum or reel with insignia
thereon" or "[a]ny other machine or any mechanical or other device
... designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with
gambling."' 36 Domain names do not fit either definition. Nonetheless,
the Commonwealth successfully convinced a trial court to issue the
seizure notice, in a hearing that did not include the domain name
owners. "7 While the legal contest over the seizure has been bogged
down in procedural questions of standing, the larger issue remains
open: Kentucky continues to assert authority over any website, and
domain name, that operates in purported violation of its laws, anywhere in the world. 38

It is unlikely that Kentucky's gambling law covers Internet domain names. The definitions for gambling devices are clearly aimed at
mechanical devices such as roulette wheels, poker tables, and slot ma-

chines,'39 and domain names are not "designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling.' 40 Moreover, Kentucky
probably could not lawfully regulate domain names even if its statute

clearly covered them. 4' Domain names, and the Internet more broad-

See id.
Mike Masnick, Kentucky's Gambling Domain Name Grab Sets a Terrible Precedent
(Techdirt Oct 10, 2008), online at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20081009/1142502506.shtml
(visited Sept 20, 2012).
134
See Order of Seizure of Domain Names, Commonwealth v 141 Internet Domain
Names, No 08-ci-1409, *1-2 (Franklin Cir Ct filed Sept 18, 2008) ("Kentucky Order of Seiat
http://www.thedomains.com/wp-content/order-of-seizure-of-domain
zure"),
online
-names.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
135
See Ky Rev Ann Stat § 528.100.
136
Ky Rev Ann Stat § 528.010(4).
Kentucky Order of Seizure at *3.
137
See Commonwealth v Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association, Inc,
138
132

133

306 SW3d 32, 34-35 (Ky 2010).
139 See Ky Rev Stat § 528.010(4)(b).
140
Ky Rev Stat § 528.010(4)(b).
141
See, for example, Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
Center for Democracy and Technology, the ACLU of Kentucky, the Media Access Project, the
United States Internet Industry Association, the Internet Commerce Coalition, and the Internet Commerce Association in Opposition to the Appeal of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Commonwealth v Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association, Inc, No 2008-ca2036, *10-13 (Ky filed May 12, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 3291802).
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2
ly, are modalities of interstate and international communication.1
Regulation of such modalities is reserved to Congress by the Commerce Clause.' To the extent that Kentucky's law interfered with interstate or international commerce, it would be preempted by the
Commerce Clause unless Congress had authorized such interference-which it expressly has not.'" Kentucky's domain name grab
constitutes a pretext-based effort to censor online gambling entities
through a statute that is, at best, tangentially related to the Internet.
This exemplifies the third method open to government censors: pretext. Pretext is also the first form of indirect, or soft, censorship analyzed by this Article.
Government censors are creative. They have employed a series of
seemingly unrelated laws as a means of restricting Internet content.
The US Department of the Treasury ordered an American domain
name registrar to disable sites owned by a company that arranges travel to Cuba, in violation of American law, even though several of the
sites were unrelated to travel."' A federal judge ordered a registrar to
cease directing traffic to WikiLeaks when the site posted documents
claiming that a Caymanian bank helped clients engage in tax fraud.'46
Like Kentucky, Minnesota sought to extend its regulations regarding
offline gambling to the Internet, temporarily ordering ISPs to block access to poker websites."' 7 The federal government has repeatedly used
civil forfeiture laws designed to prevent the loss of property used for
unlawful purposes to interdict access to websites offering allegedly
counterfeit goods or content that infringes copyright.'48
These methods represent censorship by pretext, which occurs
when state officials use unrelated laws as means of blocking access to
disfavored speech. Pretext, though, is generally permissible as a
constitutional matter, unless the government manifests unlawful
intent, 49 or the law itself is designed to discriminate among content

142

143
144

14
146

See Pataki, 969 F Supp at 181.
See US Const Art I, § 8, cl3; Mobile County v Kimball, 102 US 691, 702 (1880).
See, for example, 31 USC §§ 5361(b), 5362(10)(D)(ii).
See Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, NY Times at A16 (cited in note 14).
See Whistle-Blower Site Taken Offline (BBC News Feb 18, 2008), online at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250916.stm (visited Sept 20, 2012); Derek E. Bambauer,
Consider the Censor, 1 Wake Forest J L & Pol 31, 34-37 (2011).
147
See Willems Complaint at *16 (seeking declaratory judgment that an attempt by
Minnesota to pressure Internet casinos is unconstitutional).
148 Margaret Grazzini, Four Rounds of ICE Domain Name Seizures and Related Controversies and Opposition, Berkeley Tech L J Bolt (Berkeley Feb 23, 2011), online at
http:/Ibtlj.org/?p=917 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
149 See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 249-52 (1976) (rejecting a Title VII challenge to
a police department's hiring test).
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providers. 0 However, pretext is problematic when applied to
information. Laws regulating speech necessarily include safeguards
to prevent flaws such as vagueness, overbreadth, or content discrimination. Regulations unrelated to speech usually lack these protections and concomitantly confer greater power upon government
censors and impose greater costs on society. Moreover, they present
a heightened risk of arbitrary enforcement, since they are employed
not to address the societal interest that is the laws' initial
purpose but for an orthogonal one that empowers officials to reify
their normative preferences regarding information through
selective enforcement. 51
With domain name seizures, for example, the federal government can prevent a website from communicating at a particular address on the Internet by obtaining, in an ex parte hearing, a warrant
on the grounds that the domain name is involved in willful copyright
infringement.'52 While the loss of a single domain name may be overcome relatively readily, given that domain names are inexpensive to
register and rapidly indexed by search engines, the government must
typically demonstrate greater justification for interfering with
speech. Indeed, the standard for seizing a domain name is lower than
that government must meet to prove the underlying offense of copyright infringement, "3 and yet it enables the state to censor a website
unless its owner can show that the seizure creates substantial hardship. " Courts may well facilitate pretext-based seizures, either out of
disapprobation for the challenged content or because they fail to
recognize the importance of the First Amendment issues involved.
For example, in the first challenge to a domain name seizure by the
federal government, a federal judge dismissed the website owner's
attempt to recapture the domain name in a five-page opinion that
gave short shrift to the First Amendment problems inherent in the
forfeiture statute. 5
150

Ragland, 481 US at 227 (noting that a "discriminatory tax on the press burdens rights

protected by the First Amendment").
151
Consider Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 372, 376 (1987) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation in inventory search by police in part because there did not appear to be
bad faith or pretextual use of the search).
152
See, for example, Order, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v United States, No 11-cv-04139PAC, *1 (SDNY filed Aug 4, 2011) ("Puerto 80 Order"), online at https://www.eff.org/
files/RojadirectaOrder.pdf (visited 2Sept 20, 2009).
153
See 17 USC § 506(a)(1)-( ).
154
See 18 USC § 983(f)(1)(D).
155
See Puerto 80 Order at *4 (holding that "the First Amendment considerations discussed here certainly do not establish the kind of substantial hardship required to prevail on
this petition").
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Pretext might be particularly problematic in a zone where
American constitutional doctrine is especially lenient regarding
speech protections: intellectual property. The Supreme Court has rejected heightened scrutiny of copyright legislation on First Amendment grounds, for example, because copyright law contains built-in
safeguards such as fair use, the idea-expression dichotomy, the prohibition on copying facts, and various technical exemptions such as
exemptions for libraries and archives.156 Government efforts to prevent IP infringement thus receive greater judicial deference than
other regulation of speech does.'57 This may be worrisome when, in

fact, state enforcement of IP rights occurs at the direction of IP owners, as has occurred with the seizure of domain names that allegedly
infringe copyright law. 5 ' Conferring enforcement decisions regarding
speech on private parties with a vested interest raises concerns about
arbitrary enforcement.
Government officials can employ laws that are formally neutral,
and unrelated to Internet expression, to block access to information
of which they disapprove. Reviewing courts may permit such actions
because they agree with the underlying impulse toward censorship or
because they fail to appreciate the expressive interests at stake.' 9
Pretext-based efforts are a substantial focus of American online filtering today and represent a method of soft censorship with relatively few checks.
E. Payment
Students at the University of Dayton can use the school's network to watch YouTube videos, send e-mail, and browse the Web,
but they can't share files using peer-to-peer software such as Bit-

See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 218-21 (2003).
See, for example, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc v United States Olympic Committee, 483 US 522, 532-40 (1987) (upholding a federal law granting the United States Olympic
Committee exclusive use of the word "Olympic"); Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co, 433 US 562, 569-78 (1977) (holding that First Amendment did not protect a television
news company from suit when it televised a "human cannonball act" without the permission of
the actor); Universal City Studios, Inc v Corley, 273 F3d 429, 453-58 (2d Cir 2001) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to the DMCA).
158
See, for example, Simon Vozick-Levinson, Why Is the Department of Homeland Security Shutting Down Popular Rap Sites? An Official Explains Why They're Targeting Bloggers,
Music Mix (Entertainment Weekly Nov 30, 2010), online at http://music-mix.ew.com/
2010/11/30/homeland-security-rap-blog (visited Sept 20, 2012).
159
Puerto 80 Order at *4. See also Universal City Studios, 273 F3d at 455-58 (permitting
an injunction against hyperlinking by a website).
156
157
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Torrent.1" Administrators at the private university prevent P2P data

from transiting Dayton's network. Blocking P2P software prevents
some infringing activity-most BitTorrent traffic consists of unauthorized downloads of copyrighted materials161 -but it also prevents

Dayton students from updating their copies of World of Warcraft or
Starcraft II.162 Blizzard, the company that produces these games, uses
P2P technology to distribute patches for the games more efficiently. 163 While gainers are hardly a priority for university IT administrators, why would the University of Dayton target a specific application for filtering given these side effects?

The answer, in a word, is money. While the university notes that
P2P traffic can cause network congestion and reveal private files inadvertently, its primary reason for filtering is to ensure that the
school remains eligible for federal student aid.' 64 The Higher Education Opportunity Act 65 (HEOA) requires schools that want to re-

main eligible for such aid to implement at least one "technologybased deterrent[]" as a means of impeding unlawful distribution of
copyrighted material."6 Filtering software that blocksS167
file sharing is
explicitly listed as a canonical technology-based
1eterrent,
and the
University of Dayton believes "blocking P2P traffic is our 'safest
harbor' in meeting" HEOA requirements." Federal aid is critical to
160

See

University

of

Dayton,

P2P

File

Sharing

(2010),

online

at

http://www.udayton.edu/udit/accounts-access/p2p.php (visited Sept 20, 2012); Procera Networks, Taking Full Control of Network Resources at the University of Dayton *1, online at
http://www.proceranetworks.com/images/documents-2011-04-14/CS-Dayton-2011-4-14.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
161
A January 2010 study by Princeton computer science professor Ed Felten and his student, Sauhard Sahi, sampled 1,021 BitTorrent files available via the trackerless Mainline DHT
variant. They estimated that only 1 percent of the files were noninfringing. See Ed Felten, Census of Files Available via BitTorrent, Freedom to Tinker Blog (CITP Jan 29, 2010), online at
https://freedom-to-tinker.comlblog/felten/census-files-available-bittorrent (visited Sept 20, 2012)
(providing a breakdown of the various file types observed).
162
See University of Dayton, P2P File Sharing(cited in note 160).
163
See id; Blizzard Downloader Common Errorsand Issues (Battle.Net June 21, 2012),
online at
https://us.battle.net/support/en/article/blizzard-downloader-common-errors-andissues (visited Sept 20, 2012); Peter Smith, Rogers Communication Throttling World of
Warcraft Players (ITworld Mar 28, 2011), online at http://www.itworld.com/internet/141632/
rogers-communications-throttling-world-warcraft-players (visited Sept 20, 2011).
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See University of Dayton, P2P File Sharing(cited in note 160).
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Pub L No 110-315, 122 Stat 3078 (2008), codified in various sections of Title 20.
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HEOA § 493, 122 Stat at 3309; 34 CFR § 668.14(b)(30).
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The Manager's Report accompanying the HEOA listed four technology-based deterrents: "bandwidth shaping, traffic monitoring to identify the largest bandwidth users, a
vigorous program of accepting and responding to [DMCA] notices, and a variety of commercial products designed to reduce or block illegal file sharing." Higher Education Opportunity
Act: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4137, HR Conf Rep 110-803, 110th Cong, 2d Sess
548 (2008).
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See University of Dayton, P2P File Sharing (cited in note 160).
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many students' ability to finance higher education. 69 Losing aid eligibility would be a severe blow for a school. Thus, the federal government can use its funding power to induce schools such as Dayton
to filter content and applications that they would otherwise permit.
In short, payment is a potent tool to prod intermediaries to filter.
Using the power of the public fisc to induce censorship is particularly potent for entities that both provide Internet access and depend upon governmental grants or largesse. Universities, for example, not only receive grants to support research expenditures 7 ° but
also depend upon federally subsidized loans to their students to help
make higher education affordable. Funding, though, often comes at
the price of unfettered speech decisions. For example, Congress
mandates that institutions of higher education provide military recruiters with access to their students equal to that granted other recruiters17' and that such schools not discriminate on the basis of sex, 72
regardless of the schools' views on these topics. Schools that decline
7
to meet either condition forfeit access to certain federal funding. 1
Similarly, under the administration of Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush, federal funding for family-planning services required that recipient organizations refrain from discussing pregnancy
termination with patients.17 The relevant regulations passed constitutional scrutiny, as Congress was permitted to fund only the speech
that it intended to support. 7 '
Congress has used its power of the purse to press censorship on
schools. Under CIPA, primary and secondary schools must install filters that prevent access to materials that are obscene, that constitute
child pornography, or that are harmful to minors to obtain discounted
Internet access under the federal E-Rate program. 176 Under the
HEOA, institutions of higher education must develop and implement
plans to combat copyright infringement on their networks; these plans

169

In 2007-2008, 47 percent of postsecondary undergraduate students received federal

student aid in some form, with an average total amount of $6,600. National Center for Education Statistics, Fast Facts (Department of Education 2011), online at http://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=31 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
170
See Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship:Institutional Review Boards, 2004 S Ct
Rev 271, 321-24 (2004).
171
See 10 USC § 983(b); Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc,
547 US 47, 70 (2006).
172
See 20 USC § 1681(a); Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555, 574 (1984).
173
See Grove City College, 465 US at 575.
174
See Rust, 500 US at 179-81.
175
Id at 192-201.
176
47 USC § 254(h)(5).
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must include at least one technology-based deterrent. 77 While the implementing regulations leave it to a school's discretion to determine
what constitutes a "technology-based deterrent,' ' 8 a number of institutions moved to employ content filtering to satisfy this requirement."9
Indeed, filtering that blocks file sharing is singled out as one of the four
mechanisms that satisfies HEOA's requirements." Similarly, at least six
states have promulgated laws that condition funding for schools or libraries on those institutions engaging in Internet filtering. 181
Paying key intermediaries to filter requires the government to
allocate fiscal resources, which are always sharply contended for, to
the goal of censoring Internet content. However, despite its costs,
payment is an attractive option for at least two reasons, as demonstrated by CIPA and related state laws. First, engaging in content restrictions via the spending power, rather than by direct legislative
command, generally enables this type of soft censorship to survive
First Amendment scrutiny. The state's scope of action may be even
greater when censoring through payment. Not only can the government command that intermediaries filter certain content in exchange
for funding, it can arguably require them to block based on viewpoint as well. The Supreme Court's controversial decision upholding
limits on abortion counseling by medical providers who received
Medicaid family planning funds validated limits based on viewpoint,
despite the Court's attempts to disguise them as content-neutral provisions." The line between content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions is a malleable one that depends in large measure on how
the limit is framed. A mandate that schools and libraries block material with nudity would likely survive scrutiny as a justifiable content177
HEOA § 493, 122 Stat at 3309; 34 CFR § 668.14(b)(30). See also 20 USC
§ 1094(a)(29).
178
34 CFR § 668.14(b)(30)(i).
179
Bowling Green State University, Digital Copyright Safeguards Program-Response,
online at http://www.bgsu.edu/infosec/responsesafeguards.htm (visited Sept 20, 2012); Texas
State University-San Marcos, Copyright Infringement Deterrence Plan (July 2, 2010), online at
http://security.vpit.txstate.edu/awareness/digitaLcopyright-p2p-filesharing/copyright-infringement
_deterrence.html (visited Sept 20, 2012); Illinois State University, Peer-to-Peer(P2P) File Sharing
is Blocked on Campus (Nov 29, 2011), online at http://helpdesk.illinoisstate.edu/
kb/index.phtml?kbid=1432 (visited Sept 20, 2012); Southern Connecticut State University, Copyright and P2P File Sharing, online at http://www.southemct.edu/oit/securityandpolicy/p2p (visited
Sept 20,2012).
180
HR Conf Rep No 110-803 at 237, 548-49 (cited in note 167).
181
The states are California, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, and Utah. See National

Conference of State Legislatures, Laws Relating to Filtering,Blocking, and Usage Policies in
Schools and Libraries (Feb 13, 2012), online at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13491
(visited Sept 20, 2012). A number of other states simply mandate that schools and libraries filter without funding as enticement. See id.
182 See Rust, 500 US at 192-94.
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based restriction, l"3 but it could just as readily be framed as limiting
pro-nudity websitesl"
Additionally, the government may have greater leverage with
payment: it can implement censorship with only partial funding of
Internet access. With direct control, by contrast, the government
bears the full cost of supplying access. Philip Hamburger notes that
universities must monitor all research projects involving human subjects through institutional review boards (IRBs) to remain eligible
for federal funding from agencies that have adopted the Common
Rule as a condition of eligibility, including projects with no public
funds involved.'85 Thus, the government imposes a review procedure
on all research conducted on human subjects by paying for a portion
of it. Similarly, universities risked losing federal research funding if
any of their constituent institutions failed to grant access to military
representatives on equal terms with other recruiters -even if those
institutions did not themselves receive such monies." 6 While entities
are free to decline government funding, doing so makes them less
competitive relative to peers who accept such funding, as they must
either accept the greater costs of unfiltered provision, or pass those
costs through to users in the form of increased fees. This accomplishes the state's goal: access to prohibited material becomes more expensive. Payment may be attractive to government because it is cost
efficient: the state can control behavior for an entire institution by
funding a small part of it.' 87
Payment is a popular form of soft censorship, cabined only by
governmental willingness (and, perhaps, capacity) to spend public
funds on Net access measures.
F.

Persuasion and Pressure

WikiLeaks faced a cascade. The whistleblowing site had published a series of sensitive American diplomatic and military docu183

See American LibraryAssociation, 539 US at 203-05 (upholding a law requiring pub-

lic libraries to filter information that is "harmful to minors," including obscene material, even
though such a law is based on content).
184
Rust, 500 US at 209-11 (Blackmun dissenting) (interpreting a regulation preventing
abortion counseling as a viewpoint-based restriction of all advocacy of abortion as family planning). Sites opposing nudity would hardly include nude images.
185 See Hamburger, 2004 S Ct Rev at 301-06 (cited in note 170).
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187
Consider FCC v League of Women Voters of California,468 US 364, 400 (1984) (noting that the anti-editorializing condition on Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)
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ments related to the conflict in Afghanistan in July 2010, the conflict
in Iraq in October 2010, and the State Department in November
2010.188 Reaction from the American government was swift, and
harsh." 9 In addition to contemplating formal legal charges against
WikiLeaks contributors such as Julian Assange, government officials
sought to convince private firms involved with the site to censor it9
First, Senator Joseph Lieberman had his staff contact Amazon.com,
which hosted WikiLeaks on its cloud computing service EC2. 9' Within twenty-four hours, Amazon terminated its relationship with WikiLeaks, citing unspecified violations of the company's Terms of Service. 92 Lieberman promised continued scrutiny, saying he would ask
"what [Amazon] and other web service providers will do in the future to ensure that their services are not used to distribute stolen,
'
classified information."193
Next, payment service provider PayPal ceased processing donations to WikiLeaks, citing a letter sent by State Department legal adviser Harold Koh to WikiLeaks. 9 ' MasterCard quickly followed
suit, 95 as did Visa 96 and Discover." Banks stopped processing trans-

actions for the site.19 8 US pressure sought to choke off donations to
WikiLeaks, or at least to make them difficult and costly.
188
Yochai Benkler, A Free IrresponsiblePress: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 Harv CR-CL L Rev 311, 321-27 (2011).
189
Id at 330-39.
190
Id at 339-40. See also Bambauer, 1 Wake Forest J L & Pol at 33 (cited in note 146).
191 Ewen MacAskill, WikiLeaks Website Pulled by Amazon after US Political Pressure,

Guardian (London) 11 (Dec 2, 2010). See Charles Arthur, WikiLeaks Evades Hackers with
Shift to Amazon, (Guardian Nov 29, 2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-amazon-ec2-ddos (visited Sept 20, 2012).
192
Hal Roberts, Amazon's Terms of Service and WikiLeaks' Censorship (Guardian Dec
3, 2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/03/wikileaks
-amazon-takedown-censorship (visited Sept 20, 2012).
193
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-wikileaks (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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(visited Sept 20, 2012).
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2010), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20024776-281.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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The United States continued to apply pressure on intermediaries to cease service to WikiLeaks. After the site's US-based Domain
Name Server (DNS) provider, EveryDNS, dropped WikiLeaks as a

client (in the face of denial-of-service attacks on its servers),
WikiLeaks moved to Switch, a Swiss DNS provider.' The US government pushed Switch to stop working with WikiLeaks, but the
company refused. 200 By contrast, the American data visualization
company Tableau Software removed graphics analyzing the content
of the WikiLeaks documents in response to Senator Lieberman's
public statement."' Relatedly, the State Department sought to discourage college students from reading the leaked cables by suggesting it could lead to denial of a security clearance and thus federal

government career opportunities. 22
WikiLeaks survives. But the coordinated pressure campaign by
various US government actors reduced access to the site, increased
its costs, and sent a clear signal of American willingness to use informal means as well as formal legal mechanisms to interdict content
perceived as threatening. Political figures portrayed the organization
as anti-American; Vice President Joe Biden called WikiLeaks

founder Assange a "hi[gh]-tech terrorist,"20 3 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused the site of "an attack on the international

community ... that safeguard[s] global security, 2 °4 and Representative
Peter King sought to have the site declared a terrorist organization. 5

The pressure on US companies was significant-government officials
strongly suggested that companies doing business with the site were at
least fellow travelers, if not complicit in WikiLeaks's actions. 2°6
'9
Charles Arthur and Josh Halliday, WikiLeaks Fights to Stay Online after US Company Withdraws Domain Name (Guardian Dec 3, 2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
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200
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It is doubtful that the government could have obtained a court
order commanding Amazon.com to sever ties with WikiLeaks, or
MasterCard to cease accepting donations for the site. 07 Yet, informal
government pressures on key intermediaries accomplished what
formal legal action likely could not. The clash between WikiLeaks
and the American government illustrates the last method of censorship: persuasion and pressure. Persuasion involves a range of tactics
that employs various combinations of norms-based pressures, market
incentives, and laws. Persuasion also involves a gradient of pressure,
from moves that simply expand options to those that regulate
through "raised eyebrow '' 209 and the threat of creating new public law
if firms fail to act.29 Formally, though, persuasion is voluntary: no
one is required to censor, and no one is provided remuneration to do
SO.

Persuasion demonstrates the creativity that censors adopt when
more direct regulation is foreclosed. Utah, for example, considered a
proposal by law professor and censorship advocate Cheryl Preston to
designate as "community conscious" those ISPs who refuse to publish obscene content, remove it upon notification, and comply with
court orders that mandate removal. 210 Five states try to persuade individuals to engage in end-user content filtering by requiring ISPs
either to provide filtered Internet access 211 or to provide links to
freely available software to perform this task.2 2 These laws permit
the ISP to charge for the filtering product or service.213 The Pennsylvania state police pressed the ISP Sparklit.com to shut down a website critical of Scranton city officials, allegedly by falsely stating that

207
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the site was under investigation for criminal harassment. The FBI
had an ISP remove a private investigator's website that sought information on an informant who allegedly helped entrap a New York
lawyer in a money laundering scheme.215

Governmental persuasion comes with different levels of pressure. Free censorware expands parental options, but with little coercion to employ them."6 Governments can notify Web hosts that their
servers contain potentially objectionable content. For example, the
FBI informed Burst.net that its blogging service Blogetery was hosting material related to the terrorist group al Qaeda, including instructions on building bombs. 17 Burst.net elected to temporarily shut
down the service. The FBI instructed Burst.net that it could terminate the offending site but did not mandate that it do so.
At an intermediate level, government officials seek to change
corporate behavior through reputational sanctions. Senator Lieberman pushed Amazon.com to drop WikiLeaks as a client. Recently,
Senator Dan Coats of Indiana demanded that the television network
NBC provide him with a written account of why the network edited its
airing of the Pledge of Allegiance to exclude the words "under God,
indivisible., 218 Coats also pressed the company to detail "what actions
NBC intends to take to prevent such inappropriate edits from occurring in the future., 21 9 The "community conscious" ISP designation
overtly seeks to shame providers into restricting content; Preston intended it to single out an "ISP that's chosen to (be) helpful in eliminating pornography. If you choose not to do that, great. But the citizens in Utah will be made aware., 220 ISPs would thus choose between

214
Amended Complaint, Pilchesky v Miller, No 3:05-cv-2074, *8 (MD Pa filed Dec 21
2005), online at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/PilcheskyComplaint.pdf (visited Sept 20,
2012). See also Kreimer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 26-27 (cited in note 25).
215
Evan Ratliff, The Mark, New Yorker 56, 62 (May 2, 2011).
Australia's NetAlert program provided free filtering software to parents, but only
216

29,000 copies were downloaded and used (as against a target of 1.4 million). See Andrew Colley, Costs and Lack of Enthusiasm Threaten Free Net Nasty Blocking Plan, Australian 29 (Feb
26, 2008).
217
See Greg Sandoval, Bomb-Making Tips, Hit List behind Blogetery Closure (CNET
July 19, 2010), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20010923-261.html (visited Sept 20,
2012).
218
Dan Coats, Coats Asks NBC for Explanation of Why "Under God" Omitted from
Pledge during U.S. Open Broadcast (June 21, 2011), online at http://coats.senate.govl
newsroom/press/release/coats-asks-nbc-for-explanation-of-why-under-god-onmitted-from
-pledge-during-us-open-broadcast (visited Sept 20, 2012).
219
Id.
220
Bernick, Ways to Cut Access to Porn Studied, Deseret Morning News at Al (cited in
note 210) (alteration in original) (quoting BYU law professor Cheryl Preston).
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complying with filtering criteria or forfeiting a governmental moniker
of approval.
More forcefully, President Barack Obama's administration reportedly threatened ISPs with legislation that would mandate termination of the accounts of users accused of intellectual property infringement221 and also blocking of infringing content itself, 22 as a cudgel to
press providers to agree to implement these measures voluntarily.
The resulting agreement between ISPs and content providers was
negotiated,223 if not in the shadow of the law, then in the threat of such
shadow.224 The government has employed similar tactics to pressure
ISPs to adopt voluntary data retention measures to aid law enforcement;225 ISP resistance led to the introduction of legislation mandating
an eighteen-month retention period.226 State pressure becomes
increasingly problematic and likely illegitimate, as its forcefulness
mounts. Entities such as ISPs face a painful choice: accede to governmental demands they dislike or face mandatory measures that are
even more objectionable.
Persuasive efforts that result in private agreements to censor information become more problematic as they include a larger share of
the relevant actors and as the homogeneity or standardization of the
content restrictions increases. When then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo pressed ISPs to prevent access to Usenet news
221

Vice President Biden supported both termination and filtering at a press conference

introducing the administration's strategy to protect intellectual property. See Greg Sandoval,
Biden to File Sharers: 'Piracy is Theft' (CNET June 22, 2010), online at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20008432-261.html (visited Sept 20, 2012). The US government attempted to include user termination and filtering provisions in the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) (May 2011), online at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
i_property/pdfs/actallO5_en.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012), that would bind signatory countries to
implement these measures. Eric Pfanner, Quietly, Nations Grapple with Steps to Quash Fake
Goods, NY Times B6 (Feb 16, 2010) (describing reports that the secret agreement includes
measures to "sever copyright violators' Internet connections").
222
Pfanner, Nations Grapple,NY Times at B6 (cited in note 221).
223
See RIAA, MPAA, and Participating ISPs, Memorandum of Understanding4-14 (July 6, 2011), online at http://info.publicintelligence.net/CCI-MOU.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
224
See Jason Mick, Obama Conscripts JSPs as "Copyright Cops," Unveils "Six
Strikes" Plan (DailyTech July 8, 2011), online at http://www.dailytech.com/Obama
+Conscripts+ISPs+as+Copyright+Cops+Unveils+Six+Strikes+Plan/article22107.htm
(visited
Sept 20, 2012).
225
See Declan McCullagh, DOJ Wants Mandatory Data Retention, CBS's Tech Talk
(CBS Jan 25, 2011), online at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-20029440-501465.html
(visited Sept 20, 2012); Declan McCullagh, Gonzales Pressures ISPs on Data Retention
(CNET May 26, 2006), online at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-6077654.html (visited Sept
20, 2012).
226
See Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011 § 4(a), HR 1981,
112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec H 3644 (May 25, 2011), online at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1981rh/pdf/BILLS-112hrl981rh.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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groups, claiming that they were a source of child pornography, all of
New York's major ISPs responded in the same fashion: by dropping
Usenet." Meaningful market choice may be precluded by a standardized set of responses from access providers, driven in each case by
pressure from state actors. Measures that are voluntary for intermediaries become effectively mandatory for users.
Governmental suasion, followed by private action, appears the
least objectionable of the censorship tools. Companies that filter the
Net have done so voluntarily, at least formally, and are presumably
free to revisit their decisions. However, persuasion and pressure can
be troubling for at least four reasons. First, the government may push
intermediaries to censor speech that it could not lawfully block itself,
as with WikiLeaks or the Scranton protest site. While this method may
be less effective at times--the Swiss provider Switch ignored US efforts-it also insulates state efforts from constitutional challenge, since
private parties formally make the decisions regarding content.228 Private actors such as ISPs may be particularly vulnerable to governmental pressure, since they must interact with state regulators such as the
FCC and Department of Justice in other contexts.229
Second, the move to silence WikiLeaks raises the specter of
unequal enforcement-the government made no such attempt to dissuade or prevent publication of the cables by mainstream outlets such
23 °
Informal government presas the New York Times or the Guardian.
sure may be selectively deployed against critics, whistleblowers, or political opposition, where formal moves would be cabined by statutory
or constitutional constraints.
Third, trying to force WikiLeaks off the Internet complicates
American efforts-including by Secretary of State Clinton, a

227

See, for example, Declan McCullagh, N.Y. Attorney General Forces ISPs to Curb

Usenet Access (CNET June 10, 2008), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578-3-9964895
-38.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
228
See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc v FCC, 518 US
727, 737 (1996).
229
The FCC has substantial authority in other industries that ISPs are involved in, such
as cable television. See, for example, John Eggerton, Enforcement Bureau Recommends Denying Comcast Request to Stay Tennis Channel Decision (Multichannel News Feb 8, 2012), online
at http://www.multichannel.com/content/enforcement-bureau-recommends-denying-comcast
-request-stay-tennis-channel-decision (visited Sept 20, 2012).
230
See Benkler, 46 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 326-27 (cited in note 188). I have argued
elsewhere that there are important distinctions between mainstream media outlets and
WikiLeaks-in particular, the more rigorous ethical framework used by journalists working for
mainstream media and their accountability as American companies to American citizens. See
Bambauer, 1 Wake Forest J L & Pol at 40-41 (cited in note 146).
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WikiLeaks critic-to advocate for online free expression.21 Internet
freedom is a significant component of the State Department's policies, both rhetorically23 2 and technologically.23 3 However, China too
can claim that online material critical of its government is unlawful banned by the country's national security laws.' Similarly, China
praised British Prime Minister David Cameron's suggestion that social media be censored to prevent violence.2 5 While the equivalence
between China's censorship and America's attempts to interdict
WikiLeaks is a false one, it has rhetorical appeal.
Lastly, the clash of interests that characterizes the legislative
process often produces rules that involve protection for countervailing interests such as freedom of expression, due process, and edgebased innovation." In private negotiations, though, such interests
are unrepresented and are incorporated only insofar as either the
state or the affected firms care to consider them.238

This circumvention of limits on state power via enlisting private
cooperation is increasingly apparent in other contexts, such as data
gathering by the government. For example, Robert O'Harrow documents the close working relationship between data aggregators and

law enforcement that emerged after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.239 Law enforcement requests for information about an
231
See, for example, Rebecca MacKinnon, 'Internet Freedom' in the Age of Assange
(Foreign Policy Feb 17, 2011), online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/17/
internetfreedom in theageof~assange?page=full (visited Sept 20, 2012).
232
See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom (US Department of
State Jan 21, 2010), online at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (visited
Sept 20,2012).
233
See James Glanz and John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour around Censors, NY Times Al (June 12, 2011).
234
Deibert, et al, eds, Access Controlled at 456-59 (cited in note 81).
235
See Riots Lead to Rethink of InternetFreedom (Global Times Aug 13, 2011), online at
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/articleType/ArticleView/articleld/670718/Riots
-lead-to-rethink-of-Internet-freedom.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012) (praising Prime Minister David Cameron's suggestion to prevent rioters from using Twitter as "bold").
236
See, for example, China Report Criticizes U.S. Human Rights Record (Fox News Apr
11, 2011), online at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/11/china-issues-report-criticizing
-human-rights (visited Sept 20, 2012).
237
See, for example, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 135-45 (Prometheus 2001) (describing legislative negotiations over the DMCA).
238
Bargaining between firms in different industries might produce arrangements that
protect countervailing interests as a byproduct. For example, the new memorandum of understanding between ISPs and content owners includes an appeals process for users, a review of
measures to disrupt IP infringement by an independent expert, and grace periods between
multiple notifications of claimed infringement. See Memorandum of Understandingat *5, 7, 14
(cited in note 223). These safeguards might represent solicitude for users' interests but more
likely derive from ISP concerns about losing customers.
239
Robert O'Harrow, No Placeto Hide 2-6 (Free Press 2005).
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individual might require a warrant if made directly to that person,
but under the third-party doctrine's exception to the Fourth
Amendment, investigators can obtain data from data-mining firms
simply upon request. 240Government can evade statutory limits on data gathering as well as constitutional ones through similar means.
Geolocation data held by mobile wireless providers can be had without a warrant, 2 as can IP address records held by ISPs 242-a critical
reason for the Department of Justice's effort to force data retention
requirements upon them. In short, governmental efforts to persuade,
or pressure, private parties to act where the state itself might encounter difficulties in achieving regulatory ends are on the rise.
Persuasion seems like the paradigmatic example of permissible
soft censorship. The government, too, is permitted to speak and to
advocate for controversial positions.43 Yet there are concerns when
persuasion slides into pressure. When the government can indirectly
threaten or compel private actors to fall in line with its preferences,
there is a threat to the constitutionally protected liberty to exchange
information that is checked poorly, if at all, by standard First
Amendment doctrine. Persuasion, then, should be viewed not with
leniency, but with considerable skepticism.
This Part has introduced a taxonomy based on the level of state
involvement in content restrictions, ranging from hard censorship via
direct control of infrastructure or legal mandates to intermediaries,
through soft censorship by employing tangentially related regulation
through pretext, paying entities to filter, or persuading and pressuring key actors. The next Part assesses the legitimacy of soft censorship tactics.
II. LEGITIMACY

Legitimate censorship has four virtues: it is openly described,
transparent about what it restricts, narrow in the material to which it

240 See United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443-44 (1976) (holding that the "Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities"); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561, 563 (2009) (describing the doctrine wherein, "[b]y disclosing
to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information
revealed").
241 See Stephanie K. Pell and Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could En-

act, 27 Berkeley Tech L J 117, 133-56 (2012).
242 See 18 USC § 2703(d).
243 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L J 151, 158 (1996).
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applies, and accountable to the people it seeks to protect.2" In previous work, I have elucidated a framework to apply these four factors
to assess whether a particular regime of Internet filtering is legitimate.145 American censorship normally scores well on the accountability criterion, since it emerges from a democratic government that
must regularly defend its decisions to the voters it purports to protect. 4 6 American filtering, though, may encounter problems with
countermajoritarian concerns that are a component of accountability
analysis, such as when public schools block sites with a positive view
of homosexuality but leave ones with a negative view available.

7

Courts, however, provide a check upon majoritarian decision making,248 and advocates for minority interests, such as gay and lesbian
groups,
have recourse to them when appeals to the political branches
9
24

fail.

Analysis of filtering rules in the United States, then, turns on the
other three factors: openness, transparency, and narrowness. Concrete conclusions depend upon the details of each statute or rule, requiring greater length than is possible in this Article.2 11 It is possible,
though, to sketch rough yet helpful relative conclusions about the
soft censorship methods outlined above. This Part briefly assesses
the merits of the methods on each criterion.
A.

Openness

To date, each soft censorship method except persuasion has performed well regarding openness. For example, most governmentfunded Internet access that is filtered discloses its restrictions via
244
245
246
247

See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 386-87 (cited in note 32).
See id at 390-410.
Citizens can thus participate in filtering decisions. See id at 401-04.
See, for example, Jonathan Oosting, A CLU to Rochester High: Stop Filtering Lesbian,

Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Resource Sites (MLive Mar 28, 2011), online at
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/03/aclu-urges-rochester -high-stop.htm
(visited Sept 20, 2012); Tom Jackman, Access to Gay Web Sites at Schools?, Wash Post B2 (Apr
14, 2011).
248
But see Amanda Frost and Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the MajoritarianDifficulty, 96 Va L Rev 719, 728-40 (2010) (describing majoritarian pressures on elected judges).
249
See, for example, Suzanne Ito, ACLU Sues Missouri School Districtfor Illegally Censoring LGBT Websites, Blog of Rights (ACLU Aug 15, 2011), online at
http://www.aclu.orgfblog/free-speech-Igbt-rights/aclu-sues-missouri-school-district-illegally
-censoring-lgbt-websites (visited Sept 20, 2012) (describing suit over school filtering after appeal to school administrators failed).
250
For an example of the detailed analysis required to reach a conclusion, see Derek E.
Bambauer, Filteringin Oz: Australia'sForay into Internet Censorship,31 U Pa J Intl L 493, 516-29
(2009) (applying a four-part legitimacy framework to Australia's proposed Internet censorship
regime).
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terms of use that describe blocking or similar methods.' When the
Department of Homeland Security seized domain names for allegedly assisting in copyright infringement, the government redirected users seeking those sites to a block page disclosing the seizure and
providing information on the statutes involved.252 Payment and pretext are not inherently open, but thus far the United States has been
relatively straightforward in its implementation of content blocking
with these tactics.
Persuasive efforts, by contrast, have not been open. The openness problem with persuasion is twofold. First, the state's role in content blocking is obscured, perhaps even deliberately, by the putatively private arrangement.5 3 Thus, while the Obama administration and
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo played key roles in the agreement between content companies and ISPs to police online infringement, details on their efforts and goals are elusive. 2" The risk is
that governmental goals may be disguised as objectives of private
firms, driven by financial or competitive motives. Second, private entities may not disclose that they censor content.5 Comcast did not
alert users that it throttled BitTorrent traffic, 256 and ISPs have been
reluctant to disclose their network management practices to consumers. 257 If filtering is even marginally unpopular, ISPs may not be
candid about imposing it, or they may avoid disclosure to minimize
circumvention efforts.
It is possible for government to be open about its role in pressing content blocking on private parties. Cuomo, for example, openly
pressured ISPs operating in New York to censor Usenet newsgroups

See notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
See Steven Musil, U.S. Seizes Sites Linked to Copyright Infringement (CNET Nov 26,
2010), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20023918-93.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
See, for example, Timothy B. Lee, ISP Flip-Flops: Why Do They Now Support "Six
253
251
252

Strikes" Plan? (Ars Technica July 6, 2011), online at http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2011/
07/why-did-telcos-flip-flop-and-support-six-strikes-plan.ars (visited Sept 20, 2012).
254
See id. See also Kevin Parrish, Obama Admin Backing New Six Strikes ISP Policy
(Tom's Guide July 8, 2011), online at http://www.tomsguide.com/us/Comcast-Verizon-throttle
-six-strikes-Obama,news-11799.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
255
See FCC, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet BroadbandIndustry Practices,
25 FCCR 17905, 17925-27 (2010), online at http:Ihraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publicl
attachmatch/FCC-10-201Al.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012) ("Preserving the Open Internet").
256
Marguerite Reardon, Comcast Denies Monkeying with BitTorrent Traffic (CNET
Aug 21, 2007), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9763901-7.html (visited June
10, 2012).
See Preservingthe Open Internet, 25 FCCR at 17936-41 (cited in note 255).
257
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after
his staff
found
on persuasion
a number of such groups.
To
date,
though,
the child
levelpornography
of openness for
has been poor.
B.

Transparency

Transparency measures whether a government describes adequately the content that it blocks online and the criteria that it uses
to demarcate prohibited from permissible material. 9 Censorship can
be open without being transparent, and vice versa.26
None of the soft censorship methods has been transparent to
date. Pretext-based and persuasive methods have suffered similar
transparency problems. The range of sites that could be targeted under civil forfeiture laws, or for warnings regarding potential IP infringement, is quite broad. Simply piecing together the statutory provisions involved in forfeiture is onerous.26' Furthermore, all three soft
approaches devolve decision making on what content to block from
state actors to private ones. The Department of Homeland Security
has relied heavily on input from the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) and Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) in selecting domain names for seizure.
Similarly, the
copyright alert system set in place by the Memorandum of Understanding between ISPs and content owners places responsibility for
defining alleged infringement with content owners.263 While the meth258
See Declan McCullagh, Cuomo Strong-Arms Comcast over Usenet (CNET July 22,
2008), online at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9997051-38.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
259
Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 392-96 (cited in note 32).
260
For example, Kazakhstan admits to blocking web content but is vague about what material is off-limits, prohibiting "inappropriate" or "destructive" sites. See OpenNet Initiative,
Kazakhstan, 187
(Dec 9, 2010),
online
at http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/
files/ONIKazakhstan_2010.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012); Freedom House, Freedom on the Net
2011: Kazakhstan, 217-18
(2011),
online at http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/inlineimages/KazakhstanFOTN2011.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012). In practice, Kazakhstan
blocks political opposition material, media with political content, and circumvention tools. Id
at 218. Blocking can also be transparent, but not open: some Chinese search engines reveal
that they filter sites at governmental behest, although China is unwilling to admit to censorship. See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 394 (cited in note 32).
261
See, for example, Bambauer, U.S. Gets In on Censorship Action (cited in note 13)
(performing some "painful statutory lifting" in trying to read all the relevant statutory
provisions consistently).
262
See, for example, Andrew T. Reynolds, Application and Affidavit for Seizure Warrant, In re Rapgodfathers.com,Civ No 10-2822M, *16-19 (CD Cal filed Nov 17, 2010), online at
http://documents.nytimes.com/request-to-seize-web-sites-for-piracy (visited Jun 10, 2012) (noting agent's "discussion with MPAA and RIAA representatives" regarding rapgodfathers.com
domain name); Darlene Storm, ICE Domain Seizures Relied on Twisted Evidence and MPAA
Say So, Computerworld's Security Is Sexy Blog (Computerworld Dec 22 2010), online at
http://blogs.computerworld.com/17575/ice-domain-seizuresrelied-on-twistedevidence-and
_mpaasay-so (visited Sept 20, 2012).
263
See Memorandum of Understandingat *4-5 (cited in note 223).
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odologies employed for detecting infringement are subject to independent review, the independent experts can only recommend, not
require, changes.2 6' And payment-based approaches almost always result in the affected institution outsourcing content decisions to a thirdparty provider of filtering technology, such as Websense or Blue
Coat.265 Congress did transparently define what content must be
blocked for a school or library to qualify for the E-Rate program in
CIPA: 66 obscenity, child pornography, and material harmful to minors, where the last category is further defined similar to obscenity as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Miller v California.267 The challenge,
from a transparency perspective, is that the government is not the entity that applies this standard. It is difficult for government to be
transparent about what content it targets for blocking when a third
party makes those decisions on its behalf.
To date, soft censorship has not been transparent about what
content is targeted for filtering or how decisions regarding classification are made.
C.

Narrowness

Content filtering via soft censorship has been limited, in that
relatively few sites have been blocked, but it has not been narrow.
Narrowness has two components: overinclusivness and underinclusiveness.26 All three forms of soft censorship have been both overinclusive and underinclusive to date.
Pretext-based blocking has been strongly underinclusive. Indeed, the federal government itself has argued that owners of seized
domain names are not suffering substantial hardship because their
sites continue to operate at other domains.269 Similarly, Kentucky has
not contended that its efforts to censor gambling-related content by
seizing 141 domain names will suppress all such allegedly unlawful
online activity available to the state's residents. While there is no evidence yet that either Kentucky or the Department of Homeland Security is targeting these sites for any ulterior motive, the seizures ap264

See id at *5.

See, for example, ACLU, ACLU "Don't Filter Me" Initiative Finds Schools in Four
More States Unconstitutionally Censoring LGBT Websites, Blog of Rights (Apr 11, 2011),
online at http:/www.aclu.org/Igbt-rights/aclu-dont-filter-me-initiative-finds-schools-four-more
-states-unconstitutionally-censori (visited Sept 20, 2012).
266
See 47 USC § 254(h)(5)(B), (6)(B).
267
413 US 15 (1973). Compare 47 USC § 254(h)(7)(G) (asking whether a work appeals
265

to a "prurient interest"), with Miller, 413 US at 24.
268
See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 396-400 (cited in note 32).
269

See Puerto 80 Order at *3-4.
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pear arbitrary: there is no real effort to interdict even a significant
share of the unlawful content.
Pretext-based censorship has also been overinclusive. When the
Department of the Treasury seized domain names related to Cuban
tourism, it blocked not only commercial tourism sites but also several
sites related to the island's culture, history, and literature.27 ° The regulations authorizing seizures have an exemption for informational
materials, which appear to cover such sites.271 As the mooo.com example at the beginning of this Article suggests, technical errors by
censors have at times resulted in massive overblocking.
Payment-based blocking has been strongly overinclusive and
might have been underinclusive. The overinclusion might result from
deliberate decisions by local officials responsible for implementing
filtering or from the devolution of content categorization to private
firms whose criteria do not correspond to those of the state.7 Thus,
some public schools have blocked access to nonpornographic material on gay and lesbian issues, whether due to discomfort with the
viewpoint espoused or because the filter employed does not distinguish between such material that is harmful to minors, and that
which is not.273 Some advocates argue that filtering under CIPA is
underinclusive by permitting adults to view pornography -material
harmful to minors-on request. 4 For example, two New York City
council members introduced legislation to prevent adults from viewing pornography in public libraries when a minor is nearby, arguing
this would prevent taxpayers from subsidizing the consumption of
content harmful to children.
Persuasion-based blocking depends greatly on the private
agreement at issue. Little is known, for example, about how the new
copyright alert system negotiated between ISPs and content owners,
at the behest of the Obama and Cuomo administrations, will operate

See Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, NY Times at A16 (cited in note 14).
See 31 CFR § 515.545(a) (authorizing "[tiransactions relating to the dissemination of
informational materials"); 31 CFR § 515.332(a)(1) (defining "informational materials").
272
Consider ACLU, "Don't Filter Me" (cited in note 265); Jackman, Access to Gay Web
Sites at Schools?, Wash Post at B2 (cited in note 247).
273
See ACLU, "Don'tFilterMe" (cited in note 265) (observing, upon bringing the filtering to their attention, that some school districts immediately unblocked LGBT sites while others were more reluctant).
274
See, for example, Library Bill Aims to Keep Porn Away from Children (Times
Newsweekly May 26, 2011), online at http://www~timesnewsweekly.com/news/2011-05
-26/LocalNews/LibraryBillAimsToKeepPornAwayFromChildren.html (visited Sept
20, 2012).
275
Id.
270

271
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in practice. 216 Yet, there have been persuasive campaigns that have
resulted in extraordinary overblocking. Cuomo's effort to push ISPs
to censor Usenet news groups resulted in the providers simply dropping Usenet altogether, forfeiting a wide breadth of innocent content. That approach was also underinclusive -despite early reports,
Cuomo did not demand that ISPs filter websites, or other methods
by which child pornography is exchanged, meaning that most of the
illegal content was unaffected. 27 ISPs have incentives to underblock,
which generates less work and is less likely to antagonize customers.
Content owners have incentives to overblock, since they do not bear
the costs of treating lawful use as infringement. In short, persuasive
blocking is at risk based on narrowness.
Thus, soft censorship often fares poorly on narrowness analysis.
D.

(Il)legitimate

The methods of soft censorship outlined in Part I do not look legitimate under a process-based analytical framework. Pretext-based
and payment-based filtering can be open about censorship, but persuasion-based regimes are often hopelessly opaque. All three methods
lack transparency. Lastly, they tend to result in overblocking and underblocking, whether due to erroneous decisions, technical errors, or
normative divergence between private content classifications and public goals. Soft censorship is deeply problematic from the perspective of
the process-oriented legitimacy methodology.
III. LIMITS

Contrary to conventional scholarly wisdom, American federal
and state governments are not precluded from Internet censorship.
Rather, they are constrained in the methods that they can employ to
prevent access to material online. Thus far, constitutional limitations
based on First Amendment protections have blocked the state from
deputizing intermediaries as censors.278 However, this removes but
one arrow from government's quiver. The other four tools-direct
control over infrastructure, payment, pretext, and persuasion under
pressure-remain viable options.
276

The author represents computer security researcher Christopher Soghoian in a Free-

dom of Information Act suit against the Office of Management and Budget that seeks to compel release of documents related to the copyright alert system. Soghoian v Office of Management and Budget, No 1:11-cv-02203-ABJ (DDC 2012).
277
See Danny Hakim, Net Providers to Block Sites with Child Sex, NY Times Al
(June 10, 2008).
278
See Part I.C.
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This Part explores the limits upon each of these four methods. It
concludes with a paradox: the techniques permitted for government
use have greater practical constraints, such as resource limitations,
but far fewer of the procedural and structural checks on state power
that are at the heart of American constitutionalism, particularly for
core normative commitments such as free expression.
Limits come in multiple forms. Robust, easy to use tools that
bypass censorship can be as effective a check upon governmental
suppression of content as legal constraint. 9 Lawrence Lessig's New
Chicago School model proposes four forces by which human behavior can be shaped.' Lessig notes that law is not the only way to constrain our actions; architecture (including software code), market
forces, and social norms also play a role. A generation of Internet
scholars has sought to apply Lessig's New Chicago School modalities
to regulatory problems."' Yet, scholars have not acknowledged that
these four forces are not merely ways of regulating-they also describe ways to limit regulation. Indeed, the New Chicago School taxonomy is best seen as not merely defining regulatory options but instead as a set of interfaces between government and individuals, and
between individual citizens. This Part employs the New Chicago
School modalities to catalog the constraints on soft censorship in the
United States.
A. Code
Code appears capable of acting as a powerful brake on filtering.
Determined users can bypass even complete network shutdowns.
Egypt's citizens used international dial-up modem connections,2 sat-

279

See The Citizen Lab, Everyone's Guide to By-Passing Internet Censorship: For Citi-

zens Worldwide, 17-27 (Toronto 2007), online at http://www.nartv.org/mirror/circ-guide.pdf
(visited Sept 20, 2012). See also Ashcroft v ACLU, 542 US 656, 666 (2004). But see Erica
Naone, Censorship Circumvention Tools Aren't Widely Used, Technology Review (MIT Oct
18, 2010), online at http://www.technologyreview.com/web/26574 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
280
See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv L
Rev 501,507 (1999).
2I
See, for example, Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual Communities,
25 Berkeley Tech L J 1817, 1828 (2010) (cautioning that the four modalities do not imply that
cyberspace self-governance is ideal); Lilian Edwards, Coding Privacy, 84 Chi Kent L Rev 861,
862-63 (2010) (arguing that the modality of architecture trumps the modality of law in cyberspace); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively DistributedCopyright Enforcement, 95 Georgetown L J 1, 4
(2006).
282
See Steven Hoffer, Egypt Internet Ban: 5 Ways the Protesters Are Beating the Blackout (AOL Feb 1, 2011), online at http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/02/01/egypt-5-ways-the
-protesters-are-beating-the-internet-blackout (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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ellite access,'

and Google's "Speak to Tweet" service to communi-

cate,"f despite the state's effort to sever connections with the wider Internet. A team at the think tank New America Foundation is developing Commotion Wireless, which links wireless devices to build an ad
hoc, mesh network to provide Internet access in case of such a disruption.2" Indeed, the federal government has historically sponsored
methods of bypassing Internet censorship, from providing free anonymized Internet access to Iranians' to sponsoring circumvention
software,' to developing an "Internet in a suitcase," 9 designed to
permit activists to set up alternative networks.
There are already code-based ripostes to US soft censorship. 290
Activists have developed programs, such as the MAFIAAFire Redi-

rector add-on for the Firefox browser, which circumvent domain
name seizures.291 Engineers have provided guides to using offshore
DNS servers,2" created alternative DNS resolution methods via P2P
software,293 and explained how to use Tor to bypass filtering.294 In ad-
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See Jeremy Kirk, With Wired Internet Locked, Egypt Looks to the Sky (PCWorld Jan

28, 2011), online at http://www.pcworld.com/article/218064/with-wiredinternetilocked-egypt
_looks.to-the -sky.html (visited Sept 20, 2012).
284
See Dawn Kawamoto, Can Google Help Protesters Bypass the Egyptian Internet
Shutdown?, Daily Finance (AOL Feb 1, 2011), online at http://www.dailyfinance.com/
2011/02/01/google-twitter-saynow-egypt-protests (visited Sept 20, 2012).
285
See Ryan Singel, Report: Egypt Shut Down Net with Big Switch, Not Phone Calls,
Threat Level (Wired Feb 10, 2011), online at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/egypt
-off-switch (visited Sept 20, 2012).
286
Open Technology Initiative, Commotion Wireless (New America Foundation), online
at http://oti.newamerica.net/commotionwireless_- 0 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
287
See OpenNet Initiative, Unintended Risks and Consequences of Circumvention Technologies: The IBB's Anonymizer Service in Iran (May 5, 2004), online at
http://opennet.net/advisories/001 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
288
See Nicole Gaouette and Brendan Greeley, U.S. Funds Help Democracy Activists
Evade Internet Crackdowns (Bloomberg Apr 19, 2011), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/
(visited
news/201104-2/u-s-funds-hep-democracy-activists-evade-internet-crackdowns.htmI
Sept 20, 2012).
289
See Glanz and Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour around Censors, NY Times
at Al (cited in note 233).
290
See, for example, Drew Wilson, 8 Technical Methods That Make the PROTECT IP
Act Useless (ZeroPaid Aug 7 2011), online at http://www.zeropaid.com/news/95013/8-technical
-methods-that-make-the-protect-ip-act-useless (visited Sept 20, 2012).
291
Mozilla, Add-Ons: MAFIAAFire Redirector (Feb 13, 2012), online at
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/mafiaafire-redirector (visited Sept 20, 2012).
292
See, for example, Alucard, The Simplest Way to Bypass a DNS Block (The Simplest
July 10, 2011), http://www.thesimplest.net/pc/simplest-way-bypass-dns-block (visited Sept
23, 2012).
293
See, for example, Shelly, BitTorrent-Based DNS to Thwart US Domain Seizures
(ByteStyle Nov 10, 2010), online at http://bytestyle.tv/content/bittorrent-based-dns-thwart-us
-domain-seizures (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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dition, technical efforts to overcome censorship by authoritarian
countries could just as readily be deployed to bypass American filtering. Telex, for example, deploys deep-packet inspection to detect
embedded, encrypted codes in requests for ordinary Web pages that,
in fact, direct the system to retrieve blocked ones.2 95 Telex could be
operated by ISPs in countries that permit access to material blocked
in the United States, and American users could obtain this content
without being either interdicted or detected.296 Circumvention cuts all
censors equally.
Responses via code, though, already partially achieve the government's ends by raising the costs of communication. Circumvention tools are more challenging to use than standard Internet software. 291 People who are not technologically adept are unlikely to
work to employ proxy hosts, alternative DNS servers, or anonymizers. Put simply, there are far more people comfortable using a Mac
than using Linux-and circumvention technology is akin to Linux in
its complexity.
In addition, law can limit circumvention. The Department of
Homeland Security demanded that Mozilla, developer of the Firefox
browser, remove the MAFIAAFire Redirector from its repository,
alleging it circumvented their seizure order.298 With the advent of digital content and high-speed networks, the music and movie industries
feared the wholesale piracy of their works. 299 At their behest, Congress passed Title I of the DMCA, which banned-including on pain
of criminal penalties-the use or distribution of technologies that
bypass access controls."w This ban on circumvention for the purpose
of protecting copyright could easily be replicated to safeguard filtering. While a ban could not be perfectly enforced, it would further
augment the cost of sidestepping Internet censorship.

294
See Drew Wilson, Guide: How to Defeat US DNS Censorship (Using Tor) (ZeroPaid
Aug 1, 2011), online at http://www.zeropaid.com/news/94838/guide-how-to-defeat-us-dns
-censorship-using-tor (visited Sept 20, 2012).
295
See Eric Wustrow, et al, Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure, 1-12
(Michigan and Waterloo Aug 2011), online at https://telex.cc/pub/telex-usenixsecll.pdf (visited
Sept 20,2012).
296
See J. Alex Halderman, Anticensorship in the Internet's Infrastructure, Freedom to
Tinker Blog (CITP July 18, 2011), online at https://freedom-to-tinker.comfblog/jhaldern/
anticensorship-internets-infrastructure (visited Sept 20, 2012).
297
See Naone, Censorship Circumvention (cited in note 279).
298
See Harvey J. Anderson, Homeland Security Request to Take Down MAFIAAFire

Add-on, HJA's Blog (May 5, 2011), online at http://lockshot.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/
homeland-security-request-to-take-down-mafiaafire-add-on (visited Sept 20, 2012).
299
Litman, Digital Copyright at 122-45 (cited in note 237).
300
See 17 USC §§ 1201-04.
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Technical tools can pierce technical walls. Yet, empirical data on
use of circumvention software in authoritarian countries such as
China strongly suggests that these measures are but a minor problem
for censors." Users are relatively easily kept within the bounds of
censored platforms. The Internet is an environment of near-zero
transaction costs. 3°2 Ironically, this disempowers code as a constraint:
users have become accustomed to frictionless information environments and might be intolerant of the additional steps or slower
speeds necessary to reach prohibited materials. Code, in short, has
considerable theoretical promise to constrain censorship, and determined users will generally be able to reach blocked information.
However, filtering raises the costs of content, making it highly effective for the majority of users and weakening code's constraint.
B.

Law

Law checks censorship far less than expected.
Statutes and regulations, for example, often leave space for filtering. The DMCA immunizes service providers who block material
on copyright grounds. Section 230(c)(2) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996303 immunizes providers and users of interactive computer
services for filtering content." Even net neutrality rules, commonly
hailed as a countermeasure to online blocking, permit filtering. The
FCC's proposed net neutrality regulations, for example, protect only
lawful content and permit network operators to engage in "reasonable network management."'3' 5
The US Constitution offers a second potential form of legal constraint. Yet, the Constitution might also empower filtering. ISPs are
likely to object to net neutrality, for example, as unlawful interference with their right to make editorial decisions and, hence, to
speak.3 6 While this argument proves too much-it would mean, for
example, that common carrier regulation of telephone companies is
constitutionally prohibited3 7 and that this defect has gone unnoticed
for decades-it carries considerable rhetorical force after the Su301
302

See Naone, Censorship Circumvention (cited in note 279).
For a discussion of transaction costs, see generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social

Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
303 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, 138, codified at 47 USC § 230(c)(2).
304
See 47 USC § 230(c)(2).
305
Preservingthe Open Internet, 25 FCCR at 17951-58 (cited in note 255).
306
See Susan Crawford, Reading Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn (June 27,
2011), online at http://scrawford.net/blog/reading-brown-v-entertainment-merchants-assn/1445
(visited Sept 20, 2012).
307
See 47 USC § 202(a).
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preme Court's First Amendment decisions regarding data collection
and speech regulation during October Term 2010. 0 Moreover, relevant precedent suggests that the state has considerable freedom in
employing soft censorship. This subsection examines three potential
constitutional limits: the public forum doctrine, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, and the concept of the right of access inherent in
some First Amendment cases.
1.

Public forum doctrine.

The public forum doctrine presents one potential constraint on
censorship. However, if the doctrine constrains at all, it does so
weakly for three reasons: public forum theory is badly confused, the
analytical emphasis on state intent at forum creation encourages censorship, and the forum concept is poorly suited to platforms that
transmit information rather than storing it.
Speech requires space. American constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that speakers need a place where they can reach an audience;
the classic example is publicly owned property such as parks and sidewalks.3" There, the state may not regulate speech, save for contentneutral rules, unless "the restriction is 'necessary to achieve a 31compel0
ling state interest... and narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'
The government can prescribe how loud a speaker may be but
not the subjects upon which the speaker might declaim.31' Spaces
dedicated to public discourse are public fora. 12 Hard cases, such as
whether a university's meeting rooms 313 or a school's interoffice
mailboxes" ' constitute public fora, led to the development of the
"limited public forum" doctrine, 315 whereby the government can limit
speech to a particular purpose or subject (though it may not discriminate based on viewpoint even then).316 If government-owned space
does not fall within any of the public forum categories, then the state
308
309
310

See note 119.
See Hague v Committee for IndustrialOrganization,307 US 496, 515 (1939).
Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 BU L Rev 1975, 1982 (2011), quoting Perry Ed-

ucation Association v Perry Local Educators'Association, 460 US 37, 45 (1983).
311
See Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 803 (1989) (holding that a municipal
noise regulation applying to parks was a content-neutral restriction of speech).
312
See Southeastern Promotions,Ltd v Conrad, 420 US 546, 555 (1975) (describing a designated public forum).
313
See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 265 (1981) (discussing a university regulation
against providing rooms for purposes of "religious worship or religious teaching").
314
See Perry EducationAssociation v PerryLocal Educators' Association,460 US at 46-47.
315
See ChristianLegal Society v Martinez, 130 S Ct 2971, 2985 (2010).
316
Perry,460 US at 46-49 (noting the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination even in a
limited public forum).

Orwell's Armchair

2012]

may restrict speech within that space, subject only to rational basis
scrutiny and the requirement not to discriminate based on viewpoint.317

The public forum doctrine constrains minimally because it is
strikingly unclear-the case law evades categorization or organization.3"' It is difficult to determine what constitutes a forum-when
government property is a proper location for speech, and when it is
not.31 9 And the dividing lines that separate the various types of fora
are elusive. A sidewalk is a public forum,3 20 but not if it is owned by
the Postal Service.3 2' Funding for student organizations by public

universities qualifies as a public forum,322 and a school may not exclude religious student groups, unless they insist on admitting only
those who agree with their precepts.323

These difficulties multiply in cyberspace. This is partly because
cyberspace is largely privately owned3 24 - there are fewer candidates

for inclusion in the forum doctrine-and partly because much turns
on governmental actions and intent at the creation of the alleged fo-

rum. 2s When the government establishes a platform for communications, it may limit its ability to regulate information exchanged on
that platform. The level of constraint depends on the government's
intent in opening the forum and the restrictions it imposes initially.
Content limits operate as a one-way ratchet:3 26 the state may relax its
rules for expression, but not increase them, unless it is prepared to
close the forum entirely. This encourages the state to impose re-

strictions on communication from the inception of a new communications space.327
317
318

See id at 46.
Criticism of the doctrine is legion. See Lidsky, 91 BU L Rev at 1976 n 3 (cited in note

310) (collecting critiques).
319
See Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 Willamette L Rev
647, 652-54 (2010).
320
See Police Departmentof Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92,94 (1972).
321
See United States v Kokinda, 497 US 720, 727 (1990).
322
See Rosenbergerv Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US 819,830 (1995).
323
See Christian Legal Society, 130 S Ct at 2993.
324
See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 Berkeley
Tech L J 1115, 1117 (2005).
325
See Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc, 473 US 788,
799-800 (1985).
326
See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 656-58 (1966) (holding that Congress may
ratchet up civil rights beyond what the Court has recognized, but it may not ratchet down these
recognized rights).
327
See, for example, Culver City, WiFi Access, online at http://www.culvercity.org/
enGovernment/ITWiFi/WiFiAccess (visited Sept 20, 2012) (stating "[i]t is not the intent of
the City or the Agency to allow unlimited access to the entire Internet. Nor is it the intent of
the City or Agency to create a traditional or limited public forum (i.e., a free speech arena)").
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Evidence from efforts to create new collaborative spaces online
may act as a cautionary tale for government officials. For example,
President Obama launched an initiative to engage citizens about policy ideas to bolster transparency, participation, and collaboration in
government, known as the Open Government Dialogue. Users could

submit ideas online, comment on others' suggestions, and vote for
initiatives they favored. The Dialogue, though, quickly degenerated

into a debate over demands by some participants that President
Obama release his birth certificate to the public.328 Moreover, after
voting on over four thousand submitted ideas had finished, three of

the five most popular ideas were related to legalizing recreational
drugs.39 Thus, the Obama administration faced a hard choice: filter
content unrelated to the Dialogue's purpose and face charges of censorship330 or risk losing interested participants put off by irrelevant
posts. 31 The twin problems of online trolling332 and the economics
of attention3 33 can create a need for the government to moderate

Internet communication. For the state to engage in constitutionally
acceptable content management, it must establish a given space as a
limited or nonpublic forum. Thus, the doctrinal structure of the public forum pushes publicly funded communications platforms toward
content restrictions.
Lastly, the public forum concept is a poor fit with Internet access provisioning. As with broadcast spectrum regulation, scarcity is
implicitly at the heart of the public forum doctrine.33 ' Public school-

328

How the Open Government Dialogue Got Slimed (Federal Computer Week June 4,

2009), online at http://fcw.com/Articles/2009/06/08/buzz-open-government-dialogue-birth
-certificate.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012).
329
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Monday Apr 7, 1997), online at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/
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teachers' interoffice mailboxes,335 funding for student organizations,3"
and high school newspapers are all rivalrous resources: they are
made ineffective by overuse. The state may always impose some
rules to address scarcity (such as time, place, and manner restrictions), 33 but for limited public fora, it can go further and deal
with scarcity problems purposively. Thus, government can allocate
the resources of a limited public forum to achieve the ends for which
it was initially created.339

Scarcity, though, is only minimally relevant to governmentprovisioned Internet access. First, while all resources are theoretically limited, broadband is far less rivalrous than mailboxes or newspaper column-inches and is less scarce even than space in public parks.
Thousands of users can share an Internet connection without interfering with each other, in contrast to a sidewalk. Second, content limitations are an inapt means of addressing bandwidth scarcity. A child
sexual abuse image may be small, and a lawfully purchased movie
download may be large. File size or bandwidth use are rough proxies,
at best, for the state's goals. Content limits cannot masquerade effectively as responses to scarcity. The public forum doctrine is partly a
response to concerns about competition for scarce expressive resources. It is not well suited to contexts such as Internet access,
where scarcity is minimally relevant to the government's underlying
normative concerns.
The public forum doctrine is unlikely to constrain soft censorship.' Courts have been deferential to content regulation when the
government makes plain its intent to filter when it creates a new
public forum and abuse of online spaces will push officials to do so.
Finally, the doctrine's implicit emphasis on the scarcity of communications resources fits poorly with Internet access.

(observing that monuments, unlike speakers, interfere permanently with scarce public space
and therefore public forum analysis is not appropriate for monuments).
335
See Perry, 460 US at 46-47.
336
See Rosenberger,515 US at 830.
337
See Hazelwood School Districtv Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 268-69 (1988).
338
See Ward, 491 US at 803.
339
See Lidsky, 91 BU L Rev at 1986 (cited in note 310) (noting that the Court accepted
as reasonable the rationales advanced by the University of California in upholding its allcomers policy).
340
See Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, PublicFreedom, 30 Colum J
L & Arts 597, 599 (2007) (stating that the public forum doctrine's "practical utility to speakers
is largely committed to legislative discretion").
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Unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

Two forms of soft censorship-direct provision and public funding-offer users an implicit bargain: surf the Net for free in exchange
for accessing only part of its content. The state confers a benefit in
exchange for users giving up their right to access otherwise lawful
material. This type of bargain is policed by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which defines when government can ask citizens to
surrender constitutionally protected rights in exchange for benefits.34 '
While the doctrine could constrain provision or payment filtering, it
is unlikely to do so for three reasons: First, the Supreme Court has
already approved payment with schools and libraries, although adult

bypass requirements may present an avenue to challenge soft censorship.342 Second, the doctrine even permits viewpoint discrimination
when the state funds speech exclusion of entire categories of content,
such as pornography, that are unlikely to draw objection.343 Lastly,

unconstitutional

conditions

cases are a nearly

impenetrable

murk"-scholarly analysis struggles to reconcile conflicting prece-

dent and tends to surrender descriptive analysis in favor of prescriptive recommendations for future development. In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unlikely to significantly constrain
soft censorship.
The problem of unconstitutional conditions arose with the advent
of the welfare state. 45 As the government began to fund activities from
the public fisc, it increasingly began to condition its largesse on recipients behaving in certain ways. For example, states accepting federal
highway funds must establish a minimum age of twenty-one for the
lawful consumption of alcohol,3 and welfare recipients must permit

341

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413,

1421-28 (1989).
342
See United States v American Library Association, Inc, 539 US 194, 210-12 (2002).
343 See David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions: ChartingSpheres of Neutrality
in Government-FundedSpeech, 67 NYU L Rev 675, 688-94 (1992).
3
Scholarly articles treat the doctrine with a combination of resignation and rage. See,
for example, Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 Nw U L Rev 405, 440 (2007); Daniel
A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory,
33 Fla St U L Rev 913, 926-29 (2006); Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1416 (cited in note 341);
Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
Harv L Rev 4, 11 (1988) (noting that scholars recognize the importance of the doctrine, but
they "make[I far less sense" when attempting to describe what the doctrine is or how it arises);
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U Pa L Rev 1293, 1297 (1984) (observing that the "difficulties raised by the indirect constitutional infringements" of unconstitutional conditions evade a coherent framework).
345 See Kreimer, 132 U Pa L Rev at 1294-98 (cited in note 344).
346
See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 208-09 (1987).
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investigators to enter their homes to verify eligibility.' 7 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine asks when government may achieve indirectly what it may not do directly. For example, the federal government could not bar a nonprofit corporation from lobbying; such a ban
would violate the First Amendment.34 However, the state can condition the organization's tax-exempt status on abstention from lobbying.3'49 The challenge for the doctrine is to explain why.
Since the government cannot criminalize posting material harmful to minors on the Internet, may it make funding for Internet access contingent upon filtering such content? Yes, at least for schools
and libraries. In 2000, Congress passed legislation, CIPA, requiring
schools and libraries to install filtering software that blocked obscenity, child pornography, and materials harmful to minors as a condition of obtaining discounted Internet access or being eligible for certain government grants.3 0 The Supreme Court upheld the law
because Congress can spend funds only for the purposes for which
they were authorized, libraries traditionally did not stock pornographic materials, and the funding condition did not distort libraries'
traditional role. 1
The Court's opinion dismissed CIPA's potential effects on access
by adult library patrons to lawful, but filtered, materials by assuming
that patrons could have filters disabled upon request. 2 Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurrence made this assumption explicit: in his view,
failure to allow an adult to bypass the filter would create an as-applied
challenge to CIPA.353 Yet, the Court's opinion does not go so far, and

CIPA states only that disabling filters is permitted, not mandated. 34 It
is unclear whether CIPA operates only as a default setting for Internet
filtering. This matters for soft censorship because most governmentprovided Internet access does not offer a means for bypassing filters.
Users can petition, in some cases, to have specific sites unblocked, but
that is a question of classification, not of access to otherwise off-limits

347
See Wyman v James, 400 US 309, 326 (1971); Sanchez v County of San Diego, 464 F3d
916, 930-31 (9th Cir 2006).
348
See Citizens United v FederalElection Commission, 130 S Ct 876, 913 (2010).
349
See Regan v Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 US 540, 545 (1983).
350
See CIPA § 3601, 114 Stat at 2763A-337, codified at 20 USC § 6777. See also American Library Association, 539 US at 199.
351
American LibraryAssociation, 539 US at 211-12.
352
Id at 208-09.
353
Id at 214-15 (Kennedy concurring).
354
See CIPA § 1721(b)(6)(D), 114 Stat at 2763A-347, codified at 47 USC § 254(h)(5)(D);
CIPA § 1721(a)(5)(D), 114 Stat at 2763A-344, codified at 20 USC § 9134(f(3).
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material."' The bypass question offers a narrow path to challenge soft
censorship.
Even if a challenge were to overcome the CIPA precedent, the

unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally permits government,
when funding speech, to dole out support only to positions with
which it agrees. Viewpoint discrimination is forbidden as direct regulation.356 However, the government can choose to fund speech about
childbirth, while forbidding speech about abortion.3"7 Despite the Su-

preme Court's insistence that "the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activi-

ty to the exclusion of another,, 358 the regulations at issue plainly
funded one perspective and suppressed another. Doctors could inveigh against, but not in favor of, abortion if they wanted to accept
Title X funding. Similarly, the federal civil service can permit em-

ployees to engage in nonpartisan politics, but ban partisan activities.359 Public employees can be terminated for engaging in "insubor-

dinat[e]" speech without constitutional offense. 6 Similarly,
viewpoint limits (prohibiting pro-abortion speech) can be readily
disguised as content ones (prohibiting discussion of abortion at all,
but permitting discussion of childbirth).
The existing doctrine suffers at least two additional flaws rele-

vant to censorship. First, it creates status quo bias. When abortion is
lawful, pro-abortion speakers have less need for expression than

anti-abortion ones: inertia benefits them. A ban on one type of content-speech about abortion-affects speakers differently based on
their viewpoint.361 Second, content classifications are multifaceted

and malleable. An image of a naked woman whose body shows scars
from torture can be classified as related to nudity, human rights,
355
Compare Utah Transit Authority, Frequently Asked Questions (cited in note 78)
(providing no method to request unblocking) and Culver City, WiFi Access (cited in note 327),
with Chesterfield County, Acceptable-Use Policy at 3.B (cited in note 73) (specifying process to
request blocking or unblocking).
356
See, for example, Schacht v United States, 398 US 58, 63 (1970) (holding unconstitutional a statute that, in the context of a theatrical production, permitted praise of the armed
forces but forbade criticism).
357
See Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 203 (1991).
358
Id at 193.
359
United States Civil Service Commission v NationalAssociation of Letter Carriers,413
US 548, 556, 562 (1973). While this might seem to be a content-based restriction, the emphasis
on partisan political activity reveals it to be viewpoint based. See id at 555-56, 562.
360
Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 141 (1983) (noting that the condition would be not to
speak in insubordinate fashion).
361
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 Wm & Mary
L Rev 189, 197-200 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 Stan L Rev 113, 128-29 (1981).
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women, torture, or a combination of these categories.6 2 If the image
is tagged as nudity, though, a decision to block nudity content will
prevent access to non-erotic material with important social value 63
This problem is profound for technological censorship, which often
relies on arbitrary administrative decisions or software algorithms to
decide what material to block.3 6
Finally, the logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
utterly unclear. A condition on funding for legal assistance to indigent clients that prohibited efforts to amend or challenge existing
welfare law was held unconstitutional."' A condition on funding for
family planning that prohibited efforts to counsel on abortion was
held constitutional.3 6 Aligning the cases in a consistent, coherent
fashion is a Herculean task. Scholars have sought to characterize the
decisions as turning on whether a particular restriction is a threat or
3
an offer, 367 or as establishing default rules for constitutional rights, 6
or as defining structural limits beyond which government may not
operate 69 The most likely answer to the tangle of seemingly contradictory opinions, though, is Philip Hamburger's statement that "the
Court has been engaged in exploratory guesswork."3' 70 The sheer
uncertainty of the doctrine makes it unlikely to constrain soft
censorship.
3.

Right of access.

A final possibility is that law could constrain censorship via a
First Amendment right to access information. This option relies on
an inchoate theory of audience-oriented interests present in First
Amendment jurisprudence.37 1
See OpenNet Initiative, Saudi Arabia (cited in note 82).
See id.
364
See, for example, Marjorie Heins and Christina Cho, Internet Filters:A Public Policy
Report 2-4 (Brennan Center for Justice 2001).
365
Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 543 (2001).
366
Rust, 500 US at 203.
367
See, for example, Kreimer, 132 U Pa L Rev at 1300-01 (cited in note 344) (observing
that threats put the citizen in a worse position because of the exercise of a constitutional right
while offers expand the citizen's range of options).
368
See, for example, Farber, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 931-40 (cited in note 344) (moving the
inquiry from the rights themselves to flaws in the bargaining process between the government
and the citizen).
369
See, for example, Philip Hamburger, UnconstitutionalConditions: The Irrelevance of
Consent, 98 Va L Rev 479, 487 (2012) (arguing that the separation of powers acts equally as a
constraint upon direct government action and unconstitutional conditions).
370
Id at 488.
371 See, for example, Stanley v Georgia,394 US 557, 564 (1969) (stating "the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas"); Lamont v Postmaster General, 381 US
362

363
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Freedom of expression means more than simply a right to speak;
it implies limits on government's ability to impede listeners who wish
to hear that speech.3 72 Audience-oriented reasoning can act as a
proxy for speakers' interests, protect those of listeners, or both. Often, listener and speaker interests coincide, and the Court is able to
invoke both without careful delineation. For example, the Court invalidated a law that mandated union organizers register with the
government before seeking to enroll workers in the union, holding
that both the organizers' right to speak and the workers' right to
hear them had been violated.373

Difficulties arise when speech interests conflict: the listener does
not want to receive information,374 or the speaker does not wish to convey a message375 or inform particular listeners,37' or an intermediary ob-

jects to transmitting a particular speaker's information. 77 Speakers tend
to win such conflicts.3 7' Audience interests may help tip the balance
when the Court must select among competing speakers' interests. For
example, radio broadcasters have expressive interests at stake in selecting material to transmit, yet the Supreme Court upheld a requirement
that they broadcast involuntarily the replies of people attacked during
discussions of issues of public importance.379 There, the Court held that
301, 307 (1965) (noting that, regarding a postal regulation of communist propaganda, "the addressee in order to receive his mail must request [it] ... [which is] an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights"); Martin v City of Struthers,319 US 141, 143
(1943) (arguing "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press .. necessarily protects the right to
receive [literature]").
372
See, for example, Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844, 865-67 (1996); Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 641 (1994).
373
Thomas v Collins, 323 US 516, 534 (1945).
374
See, for example, National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie, 432 US 43,
43 (1977) (discussing an ordinance forbidding Nazis from marching through Skokie, Illinois);
Martin, 319 US at 147-48.
375
See, for example, Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705, 709-10 (1977) (examining a New
Hampshire statute preventing drivers from obscuring the "Live Free or Die" motto on New
Hampshire license places); Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 515-16 (1958) (describing a tax provision that required an oath of loyalty before tax exempt status was granted); West Virginia
State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 632-33 (1943) (discussing whether a school
may compel students to salute the flag).
376
See, for example, Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555, 576 (1980)
(holding that a criminal trial must be open to the public).
377
See, for example, Turner, 512 US at 630-32 (discussing "must-carry provisions" requiring carriage of local broadcast stations on cable systems); Miami Herald Publishing Co v
Tornillo,418 US 241, 244 (1974) (describing a newspaper's refusal to allow a politician to reply
to its adversarial editorials in its own pages).
378
See Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 420 (1989) (holding that as between flag
burners and those that do not want to see flags burned, the burners' right prevail); Cantwell v
Connecticut,310 US 296, 309-11 (1940) (holding that as between an offensive speaker and listeners on the street, the speaker's right prevails).
379
Red Lion, 395 US at 375.
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the rights of the listeners and the disparaged speakers outweighed
those of the broadcasters.' Generally, though, recipients' interests are
either marginal or unexplored. The Supreme Court invalidated a similar right of reply for print media, holding that a newspaper's right to select what it expressed trumped a claimed right of access by a political
candidate who had been criticized by the paper&'1 The Court focused
on the competing speakers' interests; the newspaper's readers were
kept in the background, relevant only insofar as they
represented the ultimate beneficiaries of the First Amendment's
safeguards.3"
First Amendment intervention on behalf of information consumers typically requires special conditions, such as resource scarcity,' difficult-to-reach populations, 38 or quasi-state functioning by
private actors who block access to speech.385 Scarcity, as discussed in
Part III.B.1, is not applicable to broadband access. In addition, scarcity is conceptually odd: government is allowed to intervene most
where the opportunity to bypass state mandates is least. Second,
most Internet consumers are not peculiarly difficult to reach. While
they may have few options for broadband access, limitations from
market structure alone rarely create cognizable First Amendment
harm.3 6 Lastly, despite attempts to classify actors such as Google as
operating in near-governmental fashion, there is no real fear that the
search engine or other Internet intermediaries operate like virtual
governments.3 8 Unlike company towns such as the one at issue in
Marsh v Alabama,3" Google cannot effectively cut off its users' access to information-Bing, Yahoo!, and Dogpile are but a few clicks
away. The sharp decrease in transaction costs created by the Internet
means that switching intermediaries is relatively easy.
The indirectness of soft censorship limits challenges based on a
First Amendment right-of-access claim. Persuasion-based methods
Id at 390.
Tornillo, 418 US at 258.
38
See, for example, id at 248-50.
383
Red Lion, 395 US at 394.
38
See Turner, 512 US at 663; PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74,
78 (1980).
3M
See Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 501, 502 (1946) (describing the efforts of a company
town to prevent the distribution of pamphlets on its premises).
3'
See, for example, Tornillo, 418 US at 248-54 (noting the dangers of media concentration but striking down a right-of-reply statute-which would have helped ensure balanced
newspaper coverage- anyway).
3
See KinderStart.com, LLC v Google, Inc, 2007 WL 831811, *1 (ND Cal); Search
King, Inc v Google Technology, Inc, 2003 WL 21464568, *2 (WD Okla).
3
326 US 501 (1946).
8
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evade review because there is, formally, no state action - censorship
occurs through decisions by private firms. Right-of-access challenges
are cognizable for payment-based censorship, but the Supreme
Court's decision on CIPA resolves them in favor of the state. Direct
governmental provision of Internet access is treated like payment. Attacks on pretext-based censorship have the greatest promise, but here
they face judicial skepticism about the merits of the banned speech,390
as well as procedural hurdles that make challenges costly and time

consuming.39' In short, while the First Amendment does protect a user's right to receive information, this particular safeguard functions
only weakly as a constraint on soft censorship.
4.

Law's limits.

Soft censorship seems like it would be limited by law. Yet law's

grip on these methods of information control is oddly weak. Doctrinal confusion, lack of state action, and statutory lacunae for filtering
all confer considerable freedom upon a government that seeks to
censor indirectly.

C. Markets
In theory, market mechanisms could limit soft censorship. ISPs
could reject government attempts to push them to censor," or run
alternative DNS servers to overcome domain name seizures,"' or

subsidize connections for eleemosynary institutions such as public
schools and libraries.394 Yet market constraints largely fail because

American markets for Internet access offer but few choices to consumers. Not only does this reduce alternatives for market exit if one
ISP filters but also it makes the government's job easier by decreas-

ing the number of firms the government must coordinate to make
soft censorship effective.
389

See CBS v Democratic National Committee, 412 US 94, 140-41 (1973) (finding no

state action in the FCC refusal to require broadcasters to accept editorial advertising).
390
See Puerto 80 Order at *4.
391
See, for example, Terry Hart, Rojadirecta: Barking Up the Wrong Tree? (Copyhype
Aug 9, 2011), online at http://www.copyhype.com/2011/08/rojadirecta-barking-up-the-wrong
-tree (visited Sept 20, 2012) (describing the procedure to challenge domain-name seizure).
392
In Britain, a few ISPs have refused to adopt the Cleanfeed filtering system voluntarily. See Christopher Williams, Small ISPs Reject Call to Filter Out Child Abuse Sites (Register
Feb 25, 2009), online at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/25/iwf-smalljisps (visited Sept
20, 2012).
393
See Wilson, 8 TechnicalMethods (cited in note 290).
394
See, for example, Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Google Picks City for Fast Internet, LA
Times B2 (Mar 31, 2011) (describing Google's announcement to provide free broadband access to some Kansas City schools).
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Pretext-based methods are the most difficult for market solu-

tions to respond to. For example, imagine that the government seizes
a domain name because its website contains content supportive of
the communist regime in Cuba 3 95 The domain name registrar, such as

VeriSign (for .com domains), will redirect requests for that domain
to a site of the government's choice.3" Since VeriSign controls the
.com registry, all DNS servers rapidly reflect the post-seizure
change.3'9 While an ISP could override VeriSign's change by editing

its DNS records to reflect the pre-seizure mapping of the domain
name, this involves incurring administrative overhead for, at most,
minimal financial reward. Seth Kreimer has documented the incentive problems that occur when intermediaries must defend marginal
speech interests,3 98 and when these are compounded with the complications of maintaining nonstandard DNS information,3 " it is likely

that access providers will not bother. Thus, a market for uncensored
access is unlikely to occur when the government employs pretextbased moves, especially when the state uses the distributed DNS
architecture to create transaction costs for resistance.
Market competition could also impede censorship efforts that
rely on persuasion. For example, the federal government partnered
with content owners to press ISPs such as Time Warner Cable to engage in technological efforts to impede copyright infringement; Time
Warner customers might flee this arrangement by turning to alternative providers, such as CenturyLink, who are not part of the agreement.4 Consumers could vote for freedom with their feet, moving
from censored providers to uncensored ones-or, at least, demandSee Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, NY Times at A16 (cited in note 14).
See dL, The Background Dope on DHS Recent Seizure of Domains (Libdrale et Libertaire Nov 28, 2010), online at http://rulingclass.wordpress.com/2010/11/28/the-backgrounddope-on-dhs-recent-seizure-of-domains (visited Sept 20, 2012) (describing the technical details
of domain-name seizures).
397
See Sean Michael Kerner, VeriSign Accelerates DNS, Enterprise Apps Today (IT
Business Edge Sep 9, 2004), online at http://www.enterpriseappstoday.com/marketing/
article.php/3406l7lVeriSign-Accelerates-DNS.htm (visited Sept 20, 2012); Microsoft, How
DNS Works, TechNet (Mar 28, 2003), online at http://technet.nicrosoft.com/en
-us/library/cc772774(WS.10).aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012).
398
Kreimer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 27-29 (cited in note 25).
399
See Cricket Liu and Paul Albitz, DNS and BIND 136-39, 143-47 (O'Reilly 5th
ed 2006).
40
For evidence of competition between CenturyLink and Time Warner, see Phillip
Dampier, CenturyLink Invests to Reinvent Themselves: Prism IPTV/25Mbps Service Arrives
(Stop the Cap! Feb 16, 2011), online at http://stopthecap.com/2011/02/16/centurylink-investsto-reinvent-themselves-prism-iptv25mbps-service-arrives (visited Sept 20, 2012). For evidence
that CenturyLink is not a party to the deal between ISPs and content owners, see Memorandum of Understandingat *21-23 (cited in note 223) (listing Time Warner Cable, but not CenturyLink, as a participant).
395
396
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ing a discount for censored access. However, market competition has
limited force in constraining persuasive soft censorship, for three
reasons.
First, most consumers have, at best, two options for residential
broadband service: the local cable operator and the local telephone
company (via DSL). A recent FCC report on high-speed Internet access, which includes data through June 2010, found that 60 percent of
residential broadband customers had only one provider who could
offer 6 Mbps access, 22 percent had two providers, and 15 percent
had none."' For slower broadband (3 Mbps downstream and 768
Kbps upstream), 23 percent of such customers had only one provider, 47 percent had two, and 3 percent had none.' Thus, for 6 Mbps
broadband, 82 percent of consumers had two choices or fewer, and
for slower broadband, 70 percent had at most two options.' 3 This is
not robust competition.
Second, consumers might have difficulty detecting filtering, particularly when it is implemented subtly. For example, Comcast
slowed, but did not block, BitTorrent traffic on its network; many
users assumed that network congestion or other technical problems
were to blame. 4°4 Similarly, some ISPs covertly redirect users' search
queries, so a consumer entering "Dell" into her browser's search bar
would be sent to a site chosen by the ISP instead of receiving a page
of Google search results. 5
Lastly, ISPs might have incentives to filter that overcome any
revenue loss from consumers who prefer uncensored access. Some
providers, such as Comcast, also own content companies, such as the
television and movie company NBCUniversal. 4°6 These companies
internalize the benefits of blocking, such as filtering content that infringes on their IP rights. Others offer high-margin services, such as
long-distance telephone calls, that are at risk of competition from
online services such as Vonage. 4°7 Blocking competitors is profitable.
401

Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Internet

Access Services: Status as of June 30, 2010 7 (FCC Mar 2011), online at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-305296Al.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
402 Id.
403
See id.
Q4
See Reardon, Comcast Denies Monkeying (cited in note 256).
405
See Jim Giles, US Internet ProvidersHijacking Users' Search Queries, Tech (New Scientist Aug 10, 2011), online at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20768-us-internet
-providers-hijacking-users-search-queries.html?full=true (visited Sept 20, 2012).
4Q6 Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What: Corncast (July 23, 2011), online at
http://www.cjr.org/resources/?c=comcast (visited Sept 20, 2012).
40
See, for example, Consent Decree, In the Matter of Madison River Communications,
LLC, 20 FCCR 4295, 4297 (2005).
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Moreover, as ISPs deploy technologies such as deep-packet inspection, they may be forced to negotiate arrangements with content
providers that mandate filtering, as using deep-packet inspection
may forfeit statutory safe harbors for copyright infringement.' Market competition will check censorship only if it is remunerative to do
so. There are reasons to doubt that the rewards are currently sufficient."
A final market alternative conceives of different governments
creating unfiltered Internet access markets-payment as constraint,
not censorship. For example, states could provide funds to schools
and libraries that agreed not to censor or could provide unfiltered
access directly. Some state-based entities, such as individual libraries,
already choose this route. For example, libraries in Berkeley, California, do not filter the Internet,4 1 ° relying on state funding as a consequence of forgoing federal E-Rate monies. In effect, California
subsidizes the Berkeley libraries' decision not to censor.
There are at least four challenges with state-based open Internet
access, though. First, state budgets are increasingly constrained by
declining tax revenues during a recession and by growing pension
obligations."' Internet access is not likely to be a significant priority.
Second, diversity cuts both ways: some states will augment censorship rather than reduce it." 2 Third, open access at the local level will
mean little if upstream access is filtered. The private bargains emerging between content providers and major ISPs do not appear to
admit of override in the case of provision to public entitiesgovernment must buy access on the same terms as any other customer." 3 Lastly, the federal government maintains trump cards: its ability
to override state decisions through contrary legislation, relying on

408
See Bridy, 89 Or L Rev at 103-07 (cited in note 31) (explaining that by taking an active role in monitoring and managing Internet traffic, ISPs risk losing the protection they were
afforded on the basis that they operate as "dumb pipes").
4W
See Kreimer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 35-40 (cited in note 25).
410
Berkeley Public Library, Policies, online at http://www.berkeleypubliclibrary.org/
about-thetlibrary/policies.php (visited Sept 20, 2012).
411
See generally Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff, and Nicholas Johnson, States Continue
to Feel Recession's Impact (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities May 24, 2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
412
See, for example, Utah Code Ann § 9-7-215 to -216 (permitting libraries to restrict
access to content in addition to obscenity, child pornography, and material harmful to minors).
413
See generally Memorandum of Understanding(cited in note 223).
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the Supremacy Clause414 and its capacity to buy adherence to its
preferences through funding mandates. 15'
The combination of the limited set of broadband provider options generally available to American broadband consumers, the increasing incentives that providers have to filter, and the challenges of
government-provided uncensored access means that market mechanisms constrain censorship weakly at best.
D.

Norms

Norms, too, falter as a constraint on soft censorship. They are
but a weak check for three reasons: framing problems, collective action problems, and heterogeneous preferences. First, norms depend
critically upon framing. Limits on Internet content, though, begin at
the thin edge of the wedge: there are few willing to lobby for access
to material that infringes copyright, or to child pornography.4 16 Opponents of filtering are at a perceptual disadvantage-they must oppose censorship on principle 417 while those who favor it will focus on
the underlying content and the harms it generates.1 In addition, censorship is rarely described as such. Instead, efforts to block access to
information are described as enforcing property rights,419 stopping pi421 or safeguarding children.4 2
racy, 4- protecting public safety,
Restricting access to disfavored content is framed to align with important social goals, and suggestions that blocking will expand are

414

See, for example, Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363,

372-73 (2000).
415
See, for example, Dole, 483 US at 210.
416
See Rick Falkvinge, The Copyright Lobby Absolutely Loves Child Pornography
(TorrentFreak July 9, 2011), online at http://torrentfreak.com/the-copyright-lobby-absolutely
-loves-child-pornography-110709 (visited Sept 20,2012).
417
See, for example, Nicole A. Ozer, No Such Thing as "Free" Internet: Safeguarding
Privacy and Free Speech in Municipal Wireless Systems, 11 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 519,
551-54 (2008).
418
See, for example, Preston, 2007 BYU L Rev at 1471-75 (cited in note 210) (describing
in detail the amount of pornography available to children on the Internet).
419
See, for example, Chris Dodd, MPAA Welcomes World Leaders' Commitment to
Protecting Creative Content from Theft, MPAA Blog (May 27, 2011), online at
http://blog.mpaa.org/BlogOS/2011/05/default.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012).
420
Victoria Espinel, Working Together to Stop Internet Piracy, The White House Blog
(July 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/07/working-together-stop-internet
-piracy (visited Aug 6, 2012).
421
Brian Shields, BART Says Riders Have No Right to Free Speech Inside Fare Gate as
Officials Preparefor Planned Afternoon Protests (KRON 4 News Aug 15, 2011), online at
(visited Sept 20, 2012) (citing the
http://www.kron4.com/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=1731
"[c]onstitutional right to safety" in defending filtering).
422
See, for example, CP80, Medical & Social Impacts, online at http://www.cp80.org/
impacts/medical-social (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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generally dismissed as slippery slope concerns that will not materialize in practice.423

Next, a collective action problem hampers the effectiveness of
norms as a constraint on soft censorship. Even if censorship is widely
disliked, few people feel strongly enough, or have a sufficient stake

in content filtering, to act. Inaction multiplies: opponents may feel
that their views are idiosyncratic since few others take action on the

issue. 24 While opponents may coalesce into small blocs of revolu-

tionaries, such as the "hacktivist" groups Anonymous or Lulzsec,
their influence is likely to be scant. 25
Lastly, norms regarding the material blocked by filtering are
variegated. IP infringement, such as the unlawful downloading and

sharing of copyrighted music and movies, is widespread 2 The music
and movie industries frequently bemoan the lack of social sanctions

for such conduct and have engaged in a series of educational campaigns designed to shift views, particularly among younger users.427
Similarly, indecent and obscene content-particularly pornography-is widely consumed, although it is also the target of social dis-

approbation in some quarters.4 2 Attitudes are mixed, if not contra423
But see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications PLC, [2011]
EWHC 1981 (Ch) *3-4 at
1-4, *67 at T 204 (holding, in the High Court of England and
Wales Chancery Division, that British Telecom must block a file-sharing site using Cleanfeed
technology initially deployed to filter child pornography).
424
For the collective action problems involved in organizing large or hidden groups, see
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 165-67
(Harvard 1965).
425
See, for example, Paul McDougall, Amazon Cloud Withstands WikiLeaks Attack, Security (InformationWeek Dec 9, 2010), online at http://www.informationweek.com/news/
security/attacks/228800075 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
426
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) claims that 95 percent of music downloads are unlawful. IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report 2009: Key Statistics *2,
online at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009-key-statistics.pdf (visited Sept 20,
2012). The research firm Envisional (commissioned by NBCUniversal) estimated that nearly
one quarter of global Internet traffic is comprised of material that infringes IP rights. Envisional, Technical Report: An Estimate of Infringing Use of the Internet 2 (Jan 2011), online
at http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-InternetUsage-Jan2Oll.pdf (visited Sept
20, 2012).
427
See, for example, CampusDownloading Video, online at http://www.campusdown
loading.com/dvd.htm (visited Sept 20, 2012); MPAA, Governments around the World Take a
Stand for Creators, Consumers, Public Awareness Campaigns, online at http://www.mpaa.org/
contentprotection/public-service-announcements (visited Sept 20, 2012); MPAA, So You Got a
Notice.. , Respect Copyrights, online at http://www.respectcopyrights.org (visited Sept
23, 2012). See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Futureof Private Copying, 76 U Colo L Rev 653, 75863 (2005).
428
See, for example, Gordon B. Hinckley, A Tragic Evil among Us (Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints Nov 2004), online at http://www.lds.org/ensign/2004/ll/a-tragic-evil
-among-us (visited Sept 20, 2012); Focus on the Family, Pornography,Social Issues, online at
http://www.focusonthefamily.comlsocialissues/social-issues/pornography.aspx (visited Sept 20,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:863

dictory: socially conservative Utah, for example, is the largest per
capita consumer of pornographic Internet content, as measured by
the number of adult service subscriptions per broadband user.429

Views on Internet gambling are more mixed,430 while filtering content
that represents a perceived threat to national security enjoys broad
popularity. 431 Thus, norms regarding blocking access vary greatly depending on the material at issue. This heterogeneity undercuts the
strength of norms as a constraint, since they will wax or wane depending upon the context. Even people opposed to censorship in
some circumstances might not have a principled objection to it: they
dislike the blocking of certain content, rather than censorship as a
method. Thus, careful targeting of disfavored content by the state
can further undercut norms-based constraints.
Careful framing by censors, collective action problems, and heterogeneous preferences regarding censorship all weaken the potential constraining power of norms on filtering.
E. Paradox
This Part envisions the New Chicago School's modalities as
means of constraining regulation, not merely implementing it. It reviews each method in the context of soft censorship and finds, surprisingly, that they check content blocking by the state minimally, if
at all. This is counterintuitive: Supreme Court jurisprudence on hard
censorship, and American values regarding free expression, suggest
that the government would be limited in attaining censorial ends, regardless of the means employed. Yet this is not so. Checks on government are practical rather than structural or doctrinal; they depend upon the state's ability to fund censorship, or to push
2012); Stop Porn Culture!, Mission Statement, online at http://stoppornculture.org/mission (visited Sept 20, 2012).
429
See Benjamin Edelman, Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?,23
J Econ Persp 209, 217 (Winter 2009) (listing Utah with 5.47 subscriptions per 1,000 broadband
users). See also Ewen Callaway, Porn in the USA: Conservatives Are Biggest Consumers (ABC
News Feb 28, 2009), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/Business/story?id=6977202&
page=l#.T9axLdX2anw (visited Sept 20, 2012).
430
See, for example, Online Gambling Debate: Barney Frank vs. Spencer Bachus, Opinhttp://www.usnews.com/opinion/
at
2009),
online
June
1,
News
ion
(US
articles/2009/06/01/online-gambling-debate-barney-frank-vs-spencer-bachus (visited Sept 20,
2012); Ryan D. Hammer, Note, Does Internet Gambling Strengthen the U.S. Economy? Don't
Bet on It, 54 Fed Comm L J 103, 104 (2001).
431
See, for example, Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, McClatchy-MaristPoll:
National Survey December 2010 23-24, online at http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp
-content/misc/usapollsUS101202/McClatchyMcClatchyMarist%20PollNational%20Survey
-December%2010,%202010.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012) (showing support for prosecuting those
who publish confidential government documents on sites such as WikiLeaks).
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intermediaries to perform it, rather than on careful legal justification
of its efforts. This freedom of action is disturbing in light of the legitimacy analysis of Part 11-government has the greatest freedom to
act where its methods are least legitimate. The next Part proposes
that if censorship is to occur, it should be performed through specific
legislation that realigns Internet blocking with the historical treatment of prior restraint.
IV. HOW TO SILENCE THE TOWN CRIER

America, like most other countries, has moved to counteract
disfavored online material not merely through punishing consumption after the fact but also by preventing access to it initially. Filtering via legal mandates to intermediaries was set back when the Supreme Court invalidated first the CDA and then COPA, and
government provides too little Internet access for significant blocking directly. In response, government regulators turned to soft censorship. This Article argues that soft censorship is less legitimate
than hard methods. It next proposes that if interdicting online content is normatively desirable - a point I do not concede-then America should return to legal filtering mandates, but ones that are significantly more protective of our shared commitment to free
expression.
Counterintuitively, this means that proposed filtering legisla432
tion, such as the PROTECT IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA), is a step in the right direction. While the PROTECT IP Act
and SOPA suffer significant shortcomings, such as their focus on
DNS filtering, grant of filtering
power to private plaintiffs, and
• 431
lack of procedural protections, they are admirably open and transparent about the censorship they seek to impose, and the process of
considering the Acts in Congress scores well on accountability
measures. 436 This Part first evaluates filtering as a potential regulato432
HR 3261, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec H 7133 (Oct 26, 2011),
online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3261ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3261ih.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
433
See PROTECT IP Act § 3(d)(2)(A), in 157 Cong Rec at S 2938 (cited in note 110).
434
See PROTECT IP Act § 4(a)(1), in 157 Cong Rec at S 2938 (cited in note 110).
435
See Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, and David G. Post, Don't Break the Internet, 64
Stan L Rev Online 34, 36 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.orglsites/default/files/
online/articles/64-SLRO-34_0.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012).
4M
Ironically, Senator Ron Wyden's "hold" on the Act, which likely blocked its adoption, seems problematic from an accountability perspective. See Ron Wyden, Wyden Places
Hold on PROTECT IP Act, Press Releases (May 26, 2011), online at http://wyden.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/?id=33a39533-1b25-437b-adld-9039b44cde92 (visited Sept 20,2012).
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ry method. Then, it turns to the key components that a filtering statute must include to meet both constitutional and legitimacy concerns. It concludes by proposing to realign treatment of online censorship with American approaches to prior restraint generally.
A. In Praise of Filtering
I have previously argued that Internet filtering's legitimacy depends upon the processes involved in its creation and implementation. This framework implicitly concedes that some censorship may
be permissible. 37 It may also be necessary. Filtering is a technological
response to the permeability of geographic borders in Internet communication."8 With analog communication, such as printed matter,
governments can control what enters their jurisdictions with some
success. Once illicit material enters their polity, they can interdict it
at the point of distribution to consumers. Law enforcement can seize
counterfeit music CDs43 9 or block obscene materials from flowing

through the postal service. 440 Online, governments can attack unlawful content when it is resident on computers within their jurisdiction.
However, it is difficult to prevent transport of material from outside
the United States to consumers within the country. Online borders
are highly porous. Filtering seeks to plug some of those holes.
Conceptually, it is difficult to object to blocking access to material that users could not lawfully possess and that could be removed if
it were hosted on servers within US control. A site hosting child pornography, obscenity, or true threats"1 could be lawfully removed from
domestic servers. Objections to Internet filtering tend to concentrate
on mistakes, and their collateral effects. Censorship opponents
correctly critique overblocking and underblocking that plague most
filtering systems,"2 and attack the lack of transparency of many cen-

437

See Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 386-88 (cited in note 32).

438

See Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless

World 92 (Oxford 2006).
439
See William C. Thompson Jr, Comptroller, Bootleg Billions: The Impact of the Counterfeit Goods Trade on New York City 12-13 (Office of Comptroller, City of New York Nov
2004), online at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/04reports/Bootleg-Billions.pdf
(visited Sept 20, 2012).
440
See 18 USC § 1461. See also Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 492 (1957).
441
See, for example, Planned Parenthoodof the Columbia/Willamette, Inc v American
Coalitionof Life Activists, 290 F3d 1058, 1086-88 (9th Cir 2002).
442 See, for example, Gordon Hull, Overblocking Autonomy: The Case of Mandatory
Library FilteringSoftware, 42 Continental Phil Rev 81, 91-93 (2009); Ozer, 11 NYU J Legis &
Pub Pol at 554-55 (cited in note 417).
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sorship procedures. "3 These problems are real. But, they are not an

objection to censorship itself. They are an objection to badly done
censorship.
Filtering, like any law enforcement mechanism, is inevitably imperfect. Deciding whether to turn to filtering as a response to unlawful content necessarily involves comparing its costs to its benefits.
This is more than a quantitative exercise: the American normative
commitment to the free flow of information weighs heavily in the
calculus. ' There are other costs beyond the loss of open communication, such as the overblocking of innocent content, the administrative cost of determining whether online material is lawful, the judi-

cial costs from challenges to filtering, the potential harm to US
efforts to guarantee Internet freedom abroad, and the expenses of
implementation for ISPs. 4'5 Yet, there are countervailing benefits as

well: greater equality of treatment for domestic and foreign content
providers, reduced access to unlawful material, and potential de-

creased costs of other enforcement methods that address unlawful
content. The outcome of this weighing is not certain. What this Article makes clear is that the underlying policy question of whether to
censor is open since soft censorship is not significantly constrained
by law or other methods.

The legitimacy of Internet censorship depends importantly on
the design and implementation of decisions about what content to
block. Here, the border-enforcement aspect of filtering presents a
difficult problem. 446 Filtering targets content hosted on sites beyond

American territory."7 The authors or owners of that content, though,
might lack the resources or incentive to defend their rights in the

443
See, for example, Nart Villeneuve, The FilteringMatrix: Integrated Mechanisms of Information Control and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace (First Monday Jan 2, 2006),
online at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/lndex.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227 (visited
Sept 20, 2012).
4"
See generally Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 Notre Dame L Rev
(forthcoming 2012) (defending free expression as a key element in privacy tort analysis).
445
For a discussion of the natural connection between administrative costs and government efforts to police IP rights, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 Yale L J 384, 394 n 15 (2009).
"6
See, for example, Bambauer, 59 Duke L J at 381-86 (cited in note 32).
4"7
There are numerous take-down provisions under US law. Some, such as that applicable to material that infringes copyright, are structured as safe harbors. See, for example, 17
USC § 512(c). Others impose criminal penalties for intermediaries such as ISPs who refuse to
take down content. See, for example, Julia Scheeres, ISP Guilty in Child Porn Case (Wired
Feb 16, 2001), online at http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2001/02/41878 (visited
Sept 20, 2012) (discussing an ISP pleading guilty for knowingly providing access to child pornography after it failed to take down images).
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United States."8 Travel and legal representation are costly, and the
site might not consider its American audience worth the bother. This
might mean that audience interests are inadequately represented in
any proceeding to determine whether filtering is lawful, or desirable.
Foreign content providers might create a positive externality for
American users: they generate more benefit than they capture
through fees or advertising. Unless there is a mechanism that creates
standing for American Internet users during censorship proceedings,
the societal harm of filtering a site might be greater than the loss to
the site's owner. Designing a system to prevent such a discrepancy is
difficult.
Yet, this Article proposes to try. Whether America should prevent its citizens from accessing certain content online is a difficult
normative question. I am skeptical. Should the government censor
the Net, however, it should do so directly-using legislation that is
tailored to the problem, that incorporates safeguards informed by
the history of prior restraint, and that creates a system that is open,
transparent, narrow, and accountable. Hard censorship is superior to
soft censorship in achieving legitimacy. This article envisions a statute whereby the government could obtain an order that would compel ISPs to block access to specific unlawful material online. A statute that could legitimately impose such censorship would have five
key features: limited standing, procedural protections, heightened
proof requirements, narrow content targeting, and public funding.
This Part next describes each requirement.
B.

Limited Standing

A statute enabling censorship of Internet material should limit
requests for filtering to the US Attorney General." 9 Prior restraint is
a constitutionally significant step: it limits access preemptively and
thereby implicates the First Amendment.45 Government officials are
ultimately (if somewhat indirectly, for the Attorney General) accountable politically for decisions and thus have incentive to weigh
448
Only one domain name owner has challenged a seizure to date. David Kravets, US
Facing Legal Challenge to Domain Name Seizures (Ars Technica June 13, 2011), online at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/us-facing-legal-challenge-to-domain-name
-seizures.ars (visited Sept 20, 2012).
449
Compare PROTECT IP Act § 4(a)(1), in 157 Cong Rec at S 2938 (cited in note 110)
(authorizing suits against domain name registrants or site operators by intellectual property
owners), with Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act § 2(b)-(c), in 156 Cong
Rec at S 7208 (cited in note 108) (limiting standing to the Attorney General).
450
See Kingsley Books, Inc v Brown, 354 US 436, 445 (1957); Near v Minnesota, 283 US
697, 716(1931).
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competing interests in deciding whether and how to restrict information. While this incentive is hardly perfect-censorship can be
popular45 -it is preferable to the incentives of private plaintiffs such
as IP owners, who are unlikely to engage in any weighing whatsoev' Limiting standing to seek censorship is conceptually similar to
er. 52
the narrower ambit of criminal penalties versus civil ones for IP infringement: the power of state authority should only be deployed for
serious offenses.453 And censorship mandated by law is per force the

application of state power."
C.

Procedural Protections

The statute should incorporate strong procedural protections for
content owners. Most critically, it should provide defendants with notice and opportunity to respond and prohibit injunctions or orders affecting the material before adjudication occurs.455 Since most content

owners would reside outside the United States, it would be harder to
provide adequate notice and for the defendants to obtain local counsel. The Attorney General should be required to notify content owners via e-mail to addresses listed as points of contact on the allegedly
unlawful Web page(s) and for the domain name under which they are
hosted,456 via physical mail to all such addresses, and via the method of

service of process for the jurisdiction in which the content owner resides,457 if it can be determined. Next, the statute should toll further action for at least ninety days, to provide time for the defendant to retain
counsel and formulate a response. 4 s Lastly, until there has been adjudication on the merits of the government's claim that the relevant material is unlawful, the material should remain available. The burden
must remain on the state to show that information should be blocked,
rather than requiring the content owner to demonstrate its lawfulness.
451
See Depken, Who Supports Internet Censorship? (cited in note 62) (reporting that 46
percent of people support censorship in some form).
452
See Ryan Singel, RIAA Believes MP3s Are a Crime: Why This Matters- Updated
(Wired Jan 9, 2008), online at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel2008/01/riaa-believes-m (visited Sept 20, 2012).
453
See, for example, 17 USC § 506.
454
Consider Cover, 95 Yale L J at 1628-29 (cited in note 40).
455
See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 Va L Rev 53, 57 (1984) (stating that "prior restraints are especially disfavored because they authorize abridgment of expression prior to a full and fair determination
of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression by an independent judicial forum").
456
See PROTECT IP Act § 4(c)(1), in Cong Rec at S 2939 (cited in note 110).
457
See FRCP 4(f)(2)(A).
458
See, for example, 18 USC § 983(a)(3)(A) (providing the government with ninety days
to file a complaint for forfeiture after the property owner has filed a claim).
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Filtering decisions should also be reviewed regularly. Orders
generated under a filtering statute should expire after one year at
most. The law should also provide a means for the content owner to
challenge the order, either because the classification of the material
as unlawful is in error or because the content has changed or been
removed. However, to reduce administrative costs, the government
should be able to renew the order if it can demonstrate to the court
that the content at the blocked location is substantially unchanged.
Similarly, the state should be able to make the required showing of
illegality more easily if content migrates. Thus, if a site hosts child
pornography images at one location, and faces a filtering order, the
government should be able to readily obtain a modified order, without the procedural requirements listed above, if the site's owner
moves those images to a new domain name or Web host. The content remains illegal; only the location has shifted.
These requirements seek to balance the risk of overblocking
that occurs when content changes or migrates with the burden on the
government to obtain filtering orders. There is an inevitable arms
race between censors and content; material moves, and censors strive
to catch up. The key is focusing on the content at issue, not its location-previous efforts such as the Pennsylvania anti-child pornography statute, 4 9 or the PROTECT IP Act 46° and SOPA, 461 have this
backwards.
D. Heightened Proof Requirements
To interdict material online, the government should have to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the targeted content is
illegal. At present, when the federal government seizes domain
names, it need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the domain name is subject to forfeiture. 462 The preponderance
standard is insufficient. Governmental interference with speech
necessitates a more demanding showing. In addition, the more
stringent standard helps resolve the externality problem discussed
above: some foreign defendants will not appear to vindicate the lawfulness of their material. Holding the government to a more exacting
burden of proof will partially offset its advantage in such cases and
provide at least some protection for audience interests.
459
Internet Child Pornography Act, 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7621-30. See also Center for
Democracy & Technology v Pappert,337 F Supp 2d 606, 619-21 (ED Pa 2004).
460
See PROTECT IP Act § 2(d)(2), in 157 Cong Rec at S 2937.
461
See SOPA § 102(c)(2).
462
18 USC § 983(c)(1).
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Moreover, the burden should apply to each URL that the government seeks to censor. If the Attorney General wants to block
every page on a website, she should have to prove under the clear
and convincing standard that each page is independently unlawful.
This will helpfully press the government to limit blocking requests
only to parts of a website, or other Internet locations, that are demonstrably illegal. Overall, the goal of the heightened proof standard is to align treatment of content that is hosted within the United
States with that for material hosted abroad: if a page, file, or torrent
can be taken down via injunction here, it can be blocked if it resides
outside American borders.
E.

Narrow Content Targeting

To avoid overblocking, even unlawful content should be filtered
narrowly. Past filtering, such as that performed by Pennsylvania ISPs
under the state's anti-child pornography statute, employed blocking
by IP address, which resulted in massive overblocking of lawful content. The domain name blocking used by the Department of Homeland Security, and proposed for the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA,
can similarly interfere with legitimate content. 463 Thus, filtering
should take place at the URL or page level, at its most expansive,
and preferably would occur at an even more granular level. Britain's
Cleanfeed system, for example, can block an offending image in a
web page but permit access to the remainder of that page's content. 4
This minimizes overblocking.
DNS filtering also results in underblocking. One critique of the
domain name seizures carried out recently by the US government is
that they are readily evaded: putatively unlawful content migrates to
new domain names, where it can be reached by users who employ
search engines to locate it.46 Indeed, WikiLeaks used just such a
method to overcome court-ordered blocking of its primary domain
name in 2008. 46 Underblocking is problematic: it increases the likelihood that the state is acting pretextually or arbitrarily, it leaves alPappert,337 F Supp 2d at 633-34.
See Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System, in George
Danezis and David Martin, eds, Privacy Enhancing Technologies 78, 78-79 (Springer 2006).
465
See Grazzini, Four Rounds of ICE Domain Name Seizures (cited in note 148); Nate
463

4M

Anderson, Do Domain Seizures Keep Streaming Sites Down? (Ars Technica Apr 17, 2011),
online at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/04/do-domain-seizures-keep-streaming
-sites-down.ars (visited Sept 20, 2012).
466
Thomas Claburn, Swiss Bank Abandons Lawsuit against WikiLeaks (InformationWeek Mar 6, 2008), online at http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=206902154 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
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legedly harmful content available, and it wastes enforcement resources on ineffectual efforts. As such, both DNS- and IP-based filtering are undesirable.
Thus, a filtering order should require US-based ISPs to block
access to the specified content using technically feasible, financially
reasonable efforts other than domain name or IP address filtering.467
The method of compliance-and even whether compliance itself is
possible-will vary among ISPs. Providers such as Mediacom, who
employ deep-packet inspection to redirect search requests (a dubious tactic), can readily implement granular filtering.4 Smaller ISPs
may not be able to do so without absorbing a significant cost burden.
When a user attempts to reach filtered content, the ISP should display a block page informing her that the material has been censored,
and why.469 Optimally, ISPs would include a link on the block page to
a copy of the filtering order. Google, for example, notifies users
when it has removed links from its search results due to a takedown
notice under the DMCA.47 ' The search engine submits all such notices to the nonprofit "Chilling Effects" project and provides a link to
the relevant notice at the bottom of the filtered search results.47'
Block pages are important to open, transparent filtering-they inform users that content has been deliberately preempted rather than
being unreachable due to technological problems or the content
owner's choice.
F.

Public Funding

Finally, the filtering statute should include public funding for additional costs that ISPs incur to block access to content.472 The filtering
support should cover the entirety of ISP costs directly attributable to
censorship orders, such as additional routers or software, technical
See, for example, PROTECT IP Act § 3(d)(2)(A)(i), in 157 Cong Rec at 2938.
See mmjrogers, Why Mediacom's DPI Policy is Both Wrong and Dangerous, Customer Support (Mediacom Apr 26, 2011), online at http://mediacomcable.com/
CustomerSupport/forumindex.php?topic=1824.0 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
469
See, for example, Websense, Block Pages, online at http://www.websense.com/
content/support/library/web/v75/triton-webjhelp/block-pages.aspx (visited Sept 20, 2012).
470
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Chilling Effects Supporters Fight Back against
Perfect
10
Challenge,
Press
Room
(Dec
23,
2010),
online
at
https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/12/22 (visited Sept 20, 2012); Bruce Byfield, Chilling
Effects Site Defends Online Freedom of Expression _(Linux May _24, 2006), online at
http://archive09.linux.com/feature/54387 (visited Sept 20, 2012).
471
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Chilling Effects Supporters (cited in note 470).
472
See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 Minn L Rev *584, 635-38, 651-53 (forthcoming 2012), online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1807076 (visited
Sept 20, 2012) (proposing federal funding for cybersecurity investments by private firms).
467
468
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staff, and support personnel. 473 The statute should establish a process
whereby ISPs can apply for reimbursement if they are able to document such expenses. Public funding is likely to be controversial during
a time of sensitivity to budget deficits, and it raises concerns about
strategic behavior by providers in assessing costs. 474 However, funding
is important for at least two reasons.
First, absent such support, the state can effectively force ISPs to
fund its content restrictions. This will increase the cost of broadband
access for ISP subscribers-in effect, the cost of filtering is passed
through to consumers, but invisibly. The pass-through operates like a
covert filtering tax, but without the checks on taxation that the political process imposes.475 Paying for censorship from the federal treasury forces at least some attention to its costs and to competing demands for resources.
Second, public funding causes the state to internalize more of
the economic costs of censorship, which act as rough, though incomplete, proxies for societal costs. The less expensive a tactic is for the
government, the more likely it is to employ that tactic. Chris
Soghoian and Stephanie Pell document how the sharply falling cost
of obtaining the geolocation of a cell phone has led to a dramatic increase in government requests for such information.476 Censorship,

too, becomes more attractive as it becomes cheaper. Forcing government to pay to censor checks this natural tendency.
G. Prior Restraint
To achieve greater legitimacy in restricting content online,
Congress should pass, and the president should sign, a specialized
filtering statute. The law would authorize the Attorney General to
seek a court order that would compel ISPs, using technically and financially reasonable measures, to block access to content. To obtain
such a measure, the government would need to provide adequate notice to the content owner and sufficient time to prepare a defense.
Filtering would be permitted only after the material was proved to
be unlawful through clear and convincing evidence. And the gov473
See, for example, 47 USC § 1008 (reimbursing telecommunications carriers for limited retrofitting of their facilities to comply with the Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act).
474
See Verizon Communications, Inc v FCC, 535 US 467, 503, 539 (2002) (upholding
FCC authority to set rates for the leasing of telephone networks to market entrants but noting
the possibility of "pervers[e]" incentives).
475
Bambauer, 31 U Pa J Intl L at 515 (cited in note 250) (discussing filtering tax).
476
See Pell and Soghoian, 26 Berkeley Tech L J at 47 n 206 (cited in note 241).
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ernment should fund the additional capacity necessary for ISPs to filter via general public revenues.
This statute would align America's Internet censorship practices
with its historic treatment of prior restraints on information. 7 Like
prior restraints in other media, filtering orders would issue only
when the government met a demanding standard. Supreme Court
precedent repeatedly emphasizes the critical role played by procedural protections, and by standards that cabin or preferably eliminate official discretion."' The statute leaves material available until
the government proves, by a heightened standard, that the content is
unlawful. And unlike the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA, the proposed statute places the risks of delay on the government, not on
content providers.' Finally, this hard censorship proposal conforms
to an underappreciated aspect of prior restraint: it is difficult for the
government to muzzle speech, but not impossible.' Censorship remains a powerful tool that the state can employ, but only when it
demonstrates extraordinary need.
H. The Wisdom of Gag Orders
This Part argues that hard censorship-in particular, a statute
that requires the Attorney General to demonstrate that specified
content is unlawful before filtering it-is preferable to soft censorship. Accordingly, it proposes the key features of such a statute, in an
effort to make any such censorship maximally legitimate by being
open, transparent, narrow, and accountable. It does not argue that
censorship is desirable. Instead, and perhaps pessimistically, this
Article contends that online censorship is inevitable: nearly every
government seeks to block some material on the Net.48' The constraints on soft censorship in the United States are weak, and the
government operates in a zone of considerable discretion. The Arti-

477
478

See John Calvin Jeffries Jr, Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 Yale L J 409,412-18 (1983).
See, for example, Freedman v Maryland, 380 US 51, 59-60 (1965) (holding insufficient

the procedural protections provided by a censoring regime that allowed a censor to disapprove
of a work without justifying, by some burden of proof, its disapproval).
479
Consider FW/PBS, Inc v City of Dallas, 493 US 215, 223-24 (1990) (holding that the
failure to set time limits on a determination of unlawful speech is a species of "unbridled
discretion").
4&
See Kingsley Books, 354 US at 441.
481
See Deibert, et al, eds, Access Controlledat 5-6 (cited in note 81) (introducing a study
that documents censorship in the fifty-six nations comprising the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and in nations comprising the postcommunist Commonwealth of Independent States).
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cle's proposal seeks to cabin that discretion and to make the debate
over the propriety of censorship an overt, active one.
Proposing a hard censorship law will be unpopular. Censorship is
anathema to most legal scholars, and to many Americans. Yet it is
likely the least bad solution. The debate is similar to that over Alan
Dershowitz's proposal for torture warrants after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001.' Dershowitz, who is opposed to torture on
normative grounds, nonetheless argued that when national security
was at grave risk, officials should be able to obtain judicial authorization to employ nonlethal torture4 3 He was roundly attacked.' Dershowitz's point, though, was that the debate was not over whether to
torture suspects-the United States has already done so, either directly or by proxy." It was whether to torture them in an open and
accountable way. It was whether Americans should have to confront
openly the consequences of their choices, and accept moral responsibility for them.
So, too, with censorship. America is already censoring the Internet. At the moment, the government does so haphazardly and
somewhat ineffectively. But the ambit of censorship is expanding. I
propose that the United States admit openly that it is engaged in
censorship, justify its practices, and encode them in specific public
law. Doing so is likely to lead to less censorship rather than more,
and it will make the filtering that does occur more legitimate.
Some will object that this process legitimates Internet censorship
in a manner anathema to deeply held American views on free expression, as enshrined in the Constitution and a host of Supreme Court
decisions. I take up this issue in my prior article, Cybersieves, and so
address it here only briefly. America has a history of censorship, from

4K
Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understandingthe Threat, Responding to
the Challenge 247-48 (Yale 2002).
483
Id. See also Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, Open Forum
(SFGate
Jan
22,
2002),
online
at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-01-22/opinion/
17527284_1physical-pressure-torture-terrorist (visited Sept 20, 2012).
46
See, for example, Charles Fried and Gregory Fried, Because It Is Wrong: Torture,
Privacy and Presidential Power in the Age of Terror 31-51 (Norton 2010) (critiquing Dershowitz's proposal as, among other things, running afoul of a "grounding commitment" that
the law is not brutal); Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor
Strauss, 48 NY L Sch L Rev 275, 275 (2003) (collecting critiques).
485
See, for example, International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the
Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody 8-9 (Feb 14, 2007), online at
http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (visited Sept 20, 2012); Vance v
Rumsfeld, 653 F3d 591, 596 (7th Cir 2011), vacd and rehearing en banc granted (7th Cir Oct 28,
2011) (describing psychological and physical torture allegedly suffered by plaintiffs at the
hands of the US military in Iraq).
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to D.H. Lawrence novels,487 to sedition

laws,48 to encryption software. 489 The Supreme Court has suggested in
dicta that even a ban on publishing material in a newspaper might be
acceptable under limited circumstances,4' 9 and a federal district court
enjoined publication of information about nuclear weapons. 49' The
DMCA pushes intermediaries such as search engines to remove links
to material that allegedly infringes copyright, on pain of potential liability for secondary infringement.4' America's commitment to free
communication is quite strong, but it is not absolute. This Article argues that this commitment should yield to countervailing values only
under laws carefully and specifically designed to balance those other
interests.
V. SOFT CENSORSHIP AS EXEMPLAR

The lessons of Orwell's Armchair have relevance for two major
scholarly and policy debates about the role of government in shaping
the online information environment. First, both sides in the net neutrality fight contemplate allowing-or even requiring -intermediaries

to censor content. However, this debate is veiled under the circumlocutions of "reasonable network management 4 93 and protection of
"lawful content," 494 rather than occurring openly. Scholars and advocates on both sides would do better to engage forthrightly about what
content may and may not be blocked. Second, recent scholarship that
supports providing government greater power to promote information
online has failed to account for the state's creativity in pressing a nor4&6
See Barak Y. Orbach, Prizefightingand the Birth of Movie Censorship, 21 Yale J L &
Humanities 251, 254-55 (2009).
487
See Kingsley InternationalPictures Corp v Regents of the University of the State of
New York, 360 US 684, 684-85 (1959); Grove Press, Inc v Christenberry, 276 F2d 433, 437 (2d
Cir 1960).
488
See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 617, 624 (1919).
489
See Bernstein v Departmentof Justice, 176 F3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir 1999), withdrawn,
192 F3d 1308 (9th Cir 1999). See also Thinh Nguyen, Note, Cryptography, Export Controls,
and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10 Harv J L &
Tech 667,671-75 (1997).
490
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mative agenda. Soft censorship demonstrates that reducing scrutiny of
government's role with online content is unwise. This Part explores
briefly how the Article's analysis illuminates these issues.
A. Net Neutrality
Scholars have been worried about content discrimination by
network providers since the commercialization of the Internet.49s The
debate turned largely on descriptive views of how innovation occurs. 496 Net neutrality became an active policy controversy when the
FCC moved to impose nondiscrimination via its Internet Policy
Statement49'and when President Obama adopted the cause as a key
initiative. 98
At a conceptual level, the debate over net neutrality appears to
recapitulate that over censorship: should providers be permitted to
filter Internet content? However, the reality is more complex. Antineutrality advocates seek to ensure discretion for network providers
in prioritizing and even routing content, without describing how ISPs
would disclose their practices in a way that would enable meaningful
consumer choice.
Those who favor net neutrality have also been less than straightforward. There appears to be no one who argues for banning ISPs
from filtering spain, or malware, or denial-of-service traffic." The
FCC, too, disguises value preferences. Its rules ban providers from
blocking "lawful content." '' The challenge is in defining what is lawful. Net neutrality is thus a misnomer. The debate is not one of
common carriage versus unfettered discretion. Rather, it is a disa495

See, for example, Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:

Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L Rev 925,
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496
Compare Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, BroadbandDiscrimination,2 J Telecomm &
High Tech L 141, 154-56 (2003) (arguing that edge-based inventiveness, on the model of Eric
von Hippel's decentralized innovation, best generates technological advance), with Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 Georgetown L J 1847,

1874-75 (2006) (contending that content discrimination is critical to create incentives for providers to innovate).
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Wireline Facilities,20 FCCR 14986, 14887-88 (2005).
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greement over what content can be blocked and over who makes
that determination.
This Article argues that it is preferable to block content using
purpose-specific rules that are open and transparent, that target material narrowly, and that develop from accountable processes. Similarly, the net neutrality debate would be improved if both sides were
more forthright. Pro-neutrality advocates want more limited blocking, and they prefer that the state specify what material ISPs can filter, but they do not embrace a mandate for unlimited communication. They fall short, in other words, on openness grounds. Ironically,
net neutrality partisans essentially favor governmentally specified
blocking: ISPs would be permitted to filter so long as they stayed
within officially described limits. Anti-neutrality advocates fail to be
sufficiently transparent: they seek to preserve ISPs' flexibility in
blocking material but do not commit to a system of disclosure regarding what they filter.
Both camps in the net neutrality arena contemplate private, and
perhaps public, blocking of Internet material. The lessons of Orwell's
Armchair suggest that the outcome of their contest will be more legitimate if they shift the discourse to focus on what content they consider
acceptable to block and why a given decision maker (the government
or private providers) should be empowered to make that choice.
B.

Content Promotion by Government

Second, the conclusions of Orwell's Armchair strongly suggest
that efforts to permit greater governmental promotion of favored
content are significantly misguided. Governmental censorship is creative and often carefully disguised. Advocates of content promotion
not only misread the history of state efforts to control content but also
ignore current circumstances. Maintaining a stringent standard of judicial review will help force the government to overtly defend its efforts to
shape the online information environment: ° Such efforts are not always misguided; indeed, they may be essential. °3 However, checking
censorial tendencies necessitates regarding them with skepticism."
A new generation of scholars has advanced arguments favoring
a greater governmental role in shaping our information environment.
502
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the FirstAmendment, 99 Mich
L Rev 281, 284 (2000).
See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 Harv
503
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They view the concentration of ownership of broadcast media outlets
as a worrisome aggregation of private power: 5 For example, Marvin
Ammori argues prescriptively that governmental content promotion
should receive less scrutiny than attempts to impede access to information and that Supreme Court precedent, properly construed, supports this conclusion descriptively. Hannibal Travis seeks to provide support grounded in legal and constitutional theory for the
FCC's shift to "prioritizing media consumers' rights to access diverse
and antagonistic sources of information and opinion."5° These scholars envision regulation as a counterweight to an information environment that is dominated by a small group of private entities, insufficiently diverse and frequently frivolous. The state, they argue, can
provide needed balance by supporting, through funding or structural
rules, content from underrepresented perspectives and on worthy yet
insufficiently addressed topics. Thus, injecting the state into the process of shaping online information can have a salutary effect.
Pro-intervention arguments, though, rest on two underexplored
assumptions: first, that the current information environment is
suboptimal and, second, that governmental action can improve the
situation."° To defend these assumptions, one must provide an account of what the information ecosystem ought to look like. Absent
such a model, the risk is that, put crudely, scholars would like to see
more discourse that favors their own preferred positions."° A principled account of how the information environment should appear must
explain why there is, or is not, the correct amount of data on creationism, or skepticism about global warming, or the existence of God.
Unfortunately, neither Ammori nor Travis offers a methodology to evaluate the state of online information, nor to measure
whether the government has achieved progress. For example, Ammori supports a theory of the First Amendment that permits the
government to advance "democratic content," which he describes as
505
See, for example, Travis, 51 Santa Clara L Rev at 491-98 (cited in note 36) (arguing
that net neutrality is a constitutional policy in the age of aggregated media power because it
guarantees innovative individuals access to crucial resources like high-speed Internet).
506
Ammori, 61 Fed Comm L J at 303-19 (cited in note 35) (supporting a viewpointneutral test for government content promotion but a strict-scrutiny test for other contentbased laws).
507 Travis, 51 Santa Clara L Rev at 420-21 (cited in note 36).
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educational, political, and viewpoint-diverse material.51° There are at
least three problems with his interventionist approach. First, it is not
clear whether, even under Ammori's vision of the First Amendment,
the state can lawfully engage in viewpoint promotion to achieve
greater viewpoint diversity. 11 Ammori's description reaches content
promotion but does not explain how viewpoint discrimination is
permissible. Second, he argues for allowing government to skew toward democratic content but does not describe how to tell that government is doing so."' This is the inverse of Cass Sunstein's critique

of status quo neutrality: Ammori assumes that the status quo is undesirable without explaining why."' Lastly, and crucially, Ammori
sees attempts to promote content as less impermissible than state efforts to restrict information. 14 He argues that the history of subsidized speech demonstrates there is little cause to worry about promotion.5 ' This conclusion is difficult to defend in light of cases
challenging discrimination in subsidized speech, from selective funding of abortion-related speech,' to limits on editorializing by broadcasters," 7 to limits on challenges to welfare law.515 In short, Ammori
makes an empirical argument about governmental treatment of
speech without empirical support for it.
Soft censorship demonstrates the flaws in the content promotion
arguments. Government is unlikely to employ its powers to advance
information without regard to its viewpoint. Filters on school computers can block pro-LGBT sites but not anti-LGBT ones. The
Treasury Department can seize pro-Cuba domain names, but not
anti-Cuba ones. Homeland Security can block sites that the MPAA
and RIAA object to but not ones their critics deplore. School boards

510
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can attempt to promote criticism of evolution disguised as balance."'
Soft censorship demonstrates the wisdom of conventional, strict scrutiny treatment of content-specific governmental action under the
First Amendment 5 OThe heightened burden of strict scrutiny forces
the state to proffer a compelling justification for its actions and increases the likelihood that efforts to guise viewpoint favoritism in
content promotion will be detected and nullified."'
CONCLUSION

Internet filtering in America has evolved. The content that it
targets has shifted, moving from a focus on sex-oriented materials,
particularly those inappropriate for minors, to concentrate on gambling, IP infringement, and national security material. The approach
employed by the state has shifted from attempts to force intermediaries such as ISPs to act as agents in censorship to less direct and less
visible methods such as payment, pretext, and persuasion through
pressure. And lastly-and most counterintuitively- the legitimacy
has shifted, and not for the better. Hard censorship efforts such as
the CDA and COPA were problematic in the wide sweep of their
prohibitions and in their attempts to wish problems away by hoping
for technological solutions. Nonetheless, they represented censorship
that was overt about its goals and rationales, and that attemptedwith great imperfection-to engage countervailing concerns such as
the rights of adult Internet users and the risks of overcriminalization.
Soft censorship does not share these virtues. It is less open and
transparent about its restrictions, and often less precisely targeted.
Accountability is diffused, particularly when the state seeks to coerce
private parties to block material but then conceals its role. The absence of direct state action limits constitutional redress and the absence of sufficient competition among broadband providers limits
market constraints. Soft censorship is both more normatively problematic than hard censorship and less restricted by the safeguards
that Americans normally rely upon when their government seeks to
shape what they say and what they read.
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This Article proposes an unexpected solution: if Americans decide, through their elected officials, that certain material should not
be readily available online, we should admit that we are willing to
censor the Internet. And we should use specialized legislation to do
so-legislation that is careful in what it targets, thorough in the procedural protections it creates, and balanced in the burdens it places
upon intermediaries such as ISPs. The debate is no longer whether to
censor: we are already doing that. The key question is how. We
should prefer Orwell's Room 101522 to Orwell's Armchair: censorship
that is overt, robustly defended, and carefully limited forces us to
take moral responsibility for our actions.
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I thank James Grimmelmann for greatly improving this metaphor.

